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 This dissertation consists of three essays which use the Arab League countries as a natural 
setting for empirical research quantifying the effects of different features of this region’s trade 
policies on member countries.  
 The first essay examines the effects of the different features of the Arab League’s trade policy 
(preferential trade agreements, market power, and bound tariffs) on the multilateral tariffs applied 
by its member countries. Overall, our results suggest that preferential agreements have a building 
block effect on multilateral tariffs because Arab League members tend to lower their applied Most-
Favored Nations (MFN) tariffs as they grant enhanced preferential access to their partners. Unlike 
earlier studies, we find that the formation of a customs union (CU) among Arab League members 
led to the same degree of external trade liberalization than forming a free trade area (FTA). 
Moreover, we find that high degree of importer market power tends to mitigate the building block 
effect of forming preferential trade agreements. 
 The second essay investigates the effects of trade policy uncertainty on the entry decisions of 
exporters to Arab League markets. Using a product-level dataset on World Trade Organization 
(WTO) members exporting to Arab League countries for the years 1998-2015, we provide 
empirical evidence that trade policy uncertainty, a result of significant gaps between tariff bindings 
and applied tariffs (tariff water), led to the reduced entry of exporters in Arab League markets. We 
then extend our analysis to investigate the effects of policy uncertainty combined with additional 
uncertainty related to falling incomes associated with the 2007-2010 worldwide economic 
downturn. Our results suggest that this macroeconomic shock has contributed to a considerably 
more uncertain economic environment, thereby affecting the decision to enter these markets. We 
also analyze exporter decisions to enter new markets when the Arab League importing country 
  
exhibits high levels of market power. We find empirical evidence confirming that the effects of 
uncertainty on entry are magnified in the presence of high levels of market power.  
 The third essay examines the effects of trade preferences granted by members of the Arab 
League on these countries’ international import prices. According to the international trade 
literature, preferential trade agreements (PTAs) lower trade barriers on imported goods from 
preferential partners, leading to consumer gains from better quality products, lower prices for 
existing products, and deteriorating terms of trade of the importing country relative to preferential 
partners. Using product-level data from 1998-2011 with information on quality-adjusted 
international import price indexes, applied MFN tariffs, preferential tariffs, and market power for 
eleven Arab League countries, we estimate the international import price effects of trade 
agreements formed by Arab League countries. We find that a one percentage point decrease in 
applied MFN tariffs leads to a fall in international import prices of about 0.16 percentage points, 
while domestic prices of imported goods, as well as those produced domestically if they are 
homogeneous, would fall by 0.84 percentage points. We also find that a one percentage point 
decrease in preferential tariffs leads to 0.084 percentage point increase in international prices, 
while domestic prices of imported goods decrease by 0.92 percentage points. Moreover, we find 
no significant effects of MFN tariffs and preferential tariffs on international import prices under a 
customs union. Furthermore, our results provide no evidence that market power affects this 
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Chapter 1 -  The Multilateral Trade Policy of the Arab League 
Countries: An Empirical Investigation 
I. Introduction 
The Arab League1 was founded in the city of Cairo in 1945 by the delegates of its first seven 
members: Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria. Over time, more 
countries have joined the league, and it currently has 22 members2. The Arab League includes only 
countries whose people mainly speak Arabic or where Arabic is an official language, and its 
members are located either in North Africa or the Middle East. The league was created to 
strengthen ties between its members and to promote policy collaboration in areas like “economic 
and financial matters, including trade, customs, currency, agriculture, and industry…”3 Since its 
creation, the Arab League has witnessed some significant changes among its members due to the 
increased complexity and competitiveness of the international economy. Consequently, members 
of the Arab League have become more integrated not just internally but with the rest of the world 
economy, as can be verified from their increased participation in negotiating trade agreements 
sponsored by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor (The General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, GATT).4 Today, thirteen Arab League countries are members of the WTO, 
and an additional five of its members are in the process of joining this multilateral body.  
                                                 
1 Previously known as the League of Arab States. 
2 In addition to its seven original members, the League has accepted as members Morocco, Tunisia, Djibouti, Algeria, 
Libya, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, Somalia, Mauritania, Palestine, and Comoros 
3 About LAS. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.lasportal.org/en/aboutlas/Pages/HistoricalOverView.aspx 
4 As stated by the former WTO Director Pascal Lamy during the Arab Economic and Social Development Summit in 
Kuwait in 2009 “because international trade is so vital to your economies (the Arab region), the WTO must also be 
vital to you.” 
2 
In this paper, we investigate two key aspects of the Arab Leagues' trade policy in determining 
their applied multilateral tariffs. One key pillar of the WTO is the Most-Favored- Nation (MFN) 
principle, which requires each member to treat the other members equally. This principle requires 
that a tariff applied on imports from a member country must be extended to imports of the same 
product from other members. The tariffs applied under the MFN principle are the main multilateral 
trade policy that we will try to explain. However, member countries can form regional trade 
agreements (RTAs), also referred to as preferential trade agreements (PTAs), which correspond to 
reciprocal agreements between two or more partners where tariffs applied on trade between 
members are lower than the tariffs applied on trade with non-member countries.56 The most 
common forms of PTAs are free trade areas (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs)7. The North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a popular example of an FTA, while the European 
Union (EU) corresponds to a CU. Clearly, PTAs are exceptions to the MFN principle because the 
WTO allows PTA members to form if they comply with certain conditions.8  
Notice that RTAs have become one of the most significant features of the international trade 
system, and the Arab League countries have participated fully in this worldwide trend. Since the 
mid-90s, the Arab League has increasingly participated in forming RTAs, with the stated intent of 
                                                 
5 Source: WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION. (n.d.). Retrieved February 26, 2017, from 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/rta_pta_e.htm . 
6 In addition to the reciprocal preferential exchanges of market access, there are also several unilateral agreements. 
Under such agreements developed countries grant non-reciprocal preferential access to developing countries. 
Examples of these unilateral agreements include the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), The African Growth 
and Opportunity Act (AGOA), Duty-free Tariff Preference for African LDCs-Morocco…etc. (source: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm). 
7 FTAs and CUs differ in how members handle their external tariffs. While the members of an FTA can independently 
set their external tariffs, CU members must comply with common external tariffs (Saggi et al., 2012). 
8 The WTO has two important clauses that allow its members to move away from the MFN principle. Article XXIV 
of the GATT enables countries to form CUs or FTAs but requires members of the reciprocal agreement to eliminate 
duties on substantially all trade between members and an enabling clause that allows developing countries to adopt 
any trade policy for development including forming RTAs (Source: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm). 
3 
strengthening member economic ties, as well as to facilitate, develop, and liberalize their trade 
regimes. Currently, members of the League are involved in 16 distinct PTAs, including some 
significant plurilateral trade agreements with each other, such as the Pan-Arab free trade area 
(PAFTA), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the FTA that includes the Gulf Cooperation 
Council and Singapore. In addition to the plurilateral agreements, individual members of the 
League have also expanded their preferential trade relations with developed countries.9 Thus, we 
have considerable variation in types of arrangements (FTAs versus CUs) and types of preferential 
partners (developing versus developed countries). As a result, one of our objectives is to 
investigate the role of RTAs among members of the Arab League in determining MFN tariffs.10  
The second key characteristic of the trade policy used by members of the Arab League is the 
degree of flexibility with which its members can change applied MFN tariffs without violating 
their WTO obligations. As pointed out in Nicita et al. (2018) and Ludema & Mayda (2013), WTO 
members negotiate the maximum tariffs they can apply, usually called bound tariffs, which are not 
the same as applied MFN tariffs. Thus, many countries (especially developing nations) have 
applied MFN tariffs lower than their bound tariffs giving them substantial leeway in changing 
MFN tariffs. That is exactly the case among Arab League countries. The overall average bound 
tariff for members of the Arab League is about 37 percentage points, while the average applied 
MFN tariff is about 12 percentage points. Likewise, about 88 percent of industries in these 
countries (defined at the ISIC level) have applied MFN tariffs at least three percentage points lower 
                                                 
9 For instance, the United States has bilateral agreements with Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman; The European 
Union has bilateral agreements with Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, and Lebanon. 
10 The proliferation of preferential trade agreements within the Arab region is in line with the international experience 
and the overall growth of these type of arrangements across countries making regionalism a traditional form of 
liberalized trade among member countries (Baldwin & Freund, 2011). As of 2018, all of WTO’s 164 members have 
become involved in PTAs. According to the WTO, during 1948-1994, there were 124 PTAs notified to the GATT and 
by 2018, the number of PTAs dramatically increased to more than 400 PTAs notified to the WTO of which 284 are 
currently in force.10 
4 
than their corresponding bound tariffs. Thus, members of the Arab League have significant policy 
space to modify applied MFN tariffs.11 Thus, one of our main objectives is to investigate whether 
the flexibility in tariff schedules among these countries provide the opportunity to use non-
cooperative MFN tariffs (i.e., tariffs that reflect importer market power).12  
To carry out our empirical analysis, we construct a detailed dataset containing trade policy 
tools, including applied MFN, preferential tariffs, bound tariffs, membership in preferential 
agreements, bilateral trade flows, and measures of the degree of market power13 for eleven 
members of the Arab League. In particular, we organize our data at the industry level (4-digit of 
the ISIC) and at the tariff line level (6-digit of the Harmonized System), which allows us to test 
the robustness of our results as well as enables us to compare our results with other research in the 
literature. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics, which indicate that the average applied MFN 
tariffs is about 12 percentage points, while the average preferential tariffs is about 7 percentage 
points. Importantly, the share of products with a high preferential margin14 is about 60 percent. 
Our dataset suggests that the average MFN tariffs applied by members of the Arab League have 
trended downward between 1998 and 2015, suggesting that Arab League countries have (on 
average) liberalized trade towards non-member countries. Our dataset suggests that average MFN 
(preferential) tariff applied by members of the Arab League was about 26 (24) percentage points 
                                                 
11 Although article XXIV of the GATT requires that for members of a PTA to form and operate a CU or FTA, they 
should reduce or remove trade barriers on substantially all goods within the group and that trade with nonmembers 
should not be more restrictive than it was before forming the PTA, but this restriction is very poorly enforced. 
12 Within the Arab League, we have two distinct groups based on when they joined the WTO. For instance, North 
African countries, as well as some Middle Eastern countries, are developing countries and are called old WTO 
members. According to Subramanian & Wei (2007) and Nicita et al. (2018), this indicates that they could apply very 
high bound tariffs based on the enabling clause. On the other hand, other members of the league with access to the 
Persian Gulf are labeled as new WTO members (e.g., Saudi Arabia joined the WTO in 2005) and have faced far more 
demanding conditions to join the multilateral trade system sponsored by the WTO. 
13 As explained in detail below, this measure corresponds to the inverse of the rest of the world’s export supply 




14 Products are classified with a high-preference margin if the difference between applied MFN and preferential tariffs 
is equal to or greater than 2.5 percentage points.  
5 
in 1998; the average tariff dropped to about 9 (2) percentage points in 2015. This reveals that 
members of the Arab League have liberalized trade over the years towards members and non-
members of the League, which suggests a positive correlation between preferential and multilateral 
liberalization.15   
Furthermore, notice that Table 2 also shows the degree to which members of the Arab League 
countries can affect their terms-of-trade by imposing optimal (non-cooperative tariffs). This 
information indicates members of the Arab League have, on average, significant market power 
since their average non-cooperative tariff is about 13 percent. Notice that their degree of market 
power varies considerably from region to region, as well as across products. For example, our 
dataset suggests that some Middle Eastern countries like the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and 
Saudi Arabia face foreign export supplies that are very inelastic, which indicates high levels of 
market power, as opposed to the export supplies faced by Northern African countries. The average 
optimal tariff for the United Arab Emirates is 33 percent as opposed to Tunisia's, which is a far 
more modest 8 percent. In summary, because these countries are mostly not constrained by WTO 
bound tariffs, theory predicts that their applied MFN tariffs would be positively related to market 
power (Broda et al., 2008). 
Our empirical strategy follows these main insights. In particular, using a panel data strategy, 
we investigate the main determinants of the applied MFN tariffs imposed by members of the Arab 
League. We control for the usual macroeconomic factors (exchange rate changes, economic 
growth, among others) by using country-level fixed effects that vary by year, while we control for 
political economy factors by using country-level fixed effects that vary by industry. Our empirical 
                                                 
15 For example, in 2006, the average applied MFN tariff in Morocco was 26.66 percentage points, but by 2015, it fell 
to 13.75 percentage points. During that period, Morocco formed additional agreements with the United States and 
with Turkey. In the case of Morocco, the average preferential tariff dropped from 32.54 percentage points in 2000 to 
3.03 percentage points in 2015. 
6 
strategy controls for the two main elements of the trade policy pursued by members of the Arab 
League. Our basic specification explores how preferential tariffs affect MFN tariffs applied by 
Arab League nations. Our results reveal the presence of endogeneity bias, for which we controlled 
using lagged values of preferential tariffs and, extensively, by using instrumental variables. We 
also extend our specification by controlling for other essential elements in the trade policy adopted 
by members of the Arab League. In particular, we control for possible different effects of RTAs 
(FTA versus CU), the presence of applied MFN tariffs below bound tariffs, and for the degree of 
market power of importing economies on MFN tariffs. 
Our benchmark results suggest that the lower the preferential tariffs, the lower the applied 
MFN tariff tended to be. In our preferred specification, we use a Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) based instrumental variable approach to conclude that a one percentage point decrease in 
average preferential tariffs leads to a 0.506 percentage point decrease in applied MFN tariffs. Thus, 
we find that preferential trade liberalization is a building block to multilateral trade liberalization. 
Also, unlike previous studies, we find that the effects of liberalization through CUs differ little 
from the effects of liberalization through FTAs. They seem equally essential building blocks. 
Likewise, we also find that the building block effect related to preferential trade tends to decrease 
with the degree of market power of the importing nation. More specifically, we find that a one 
percentage point decrease in preferential tariffs tends to decrease by 0.650 percentage points the 
MFN tariff applied to products where an importer has low market power, but applied to products 
where an importer has high market power, the decrease in the MFN tariff is only 0.249 percentage 
points.  A series of robustness tests involving data at 6-digits, including another set of fixed effects, 
using two different subsamples where we divide our data into Northern African countries and 
7 
Middle Eastern countries, both at the ISIC and at the 6 digits level, confirm preferential agreements 
as building blocks and the mitigating effects of higher levels of market power on this effect.      
Our paper is related to two strands from the literature on the primary determinants of 
multilateral trade policy. On the one hand, our paper is related to papers that investigate whether 
forming RTAs represents a stumbling block or building block for multilateral trade policy. The 
literature has presented contradictory results on this strand. Limão (2006) states that U.S. 
preferential agreements create a stumbling block for U.S. multilateral tariffs because preferential 
access also has noneconomic objectives.16 In this case, the non-economic objectives indicate that 
the U.S. must reciprocate the provision of non-economic goods with a significant preference 
margin, thus creating a stumbling block effect.17 In contrast, Estevadeordal et al. (2008) note that 
preferential agreements involving developing countries (e.g., Latin America) do have a building 
block effect because participating in these agreements requires reciprocal exchange of market 
access. Moreover, Estevadeordal et al. (2008) conclude that multilateral tariffs tend to be lower 
under FTAs than CUs18. These conflicting results suggest that incentives to grant preferential 
access through FTAs may differ from incentives present under CUs; they may also point out that 
development status also helps to determine the effects of tariff preferences on multilateral tariffs.19 
                                                 
16 Non-economic objectives involve small partners who provide public goods like spreading and enforcing democratic 
values, enforcing property rights, improving the rule of law, respecting labor standards, fighting against illegal 
immigration and drugs. 
17 Karacaovali & Limao (2008) also clarify the effect of PTA on multilateral trade liberalization (MTL) using detailed 
tariff data for the European Union. Their findings also showed that PTAs slowed multilateralism. 
18 Calvo-Pardo et al. (2009) examine the effect of the ASEAN FTA on multilateral trade liberalization and find tariff 
complementarity between changes in preferential tariffs and multilateralism. 
19 Ketterer et al. (2014) examined the impact of tariff preferences on Canada’s multilateral tariffs. Their findings 
supported the building block effect of CUSFTA. They argued that their results showing the building block effect 
instead of the stumbling block effect reported in both Limao (2006) and Karacaovali & Limao (2008) for the US and 
EU is because the agreements involved in the US and EU were among developed nations granting preferential access 
to developing countries while having non-economic objectives.  
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Our paper is also related to the strand of the literature that explicates how market power helps 
determine applied MFN tariffs. Broda et al. (2008) show that non-WTO members apply tariffs 
that reflect their market power. Bagwell & Staiger (2011) show that, for a group of countries that 
have recently joined the WTO, tariffs are more cooperative after their accession process was 
concluded. Their results indicate that WTO membership is important in internalizing some terms-
of-trade externalities that are present in countries not constrained by WTO policies. However, 
Nicita et al. (2018) show that the tariffs applied by WTO members reflect their market power when 
bound tariffs are higher than applied MFN tariffs (i.e., in the presence of tariff water). As they 
explain it, the average WTO member has bound tariffs three times higher than applied tariffs, 
allowing members to set tariffs reflecting their market power without violating their WTO 
obligations20. As we have already explained, our dataset consists of WTO members with bound 
tariffs significantly higher than applied tariffs, which, in principle, allows members to impose 
tariffs that reflect their market power.  
Our strategy improves on the methods of previous studies in several ways. First, we investigate 
the effects of PTAs on applied MFN tariffs while also considering preferential agreements more 
in line with the de jure definition under the WTO. Notice that Estevadoerdal et al. (2008) report 
that granting preferential access under CUs neither generates a stumbling block nor a building 
block for multilateral tariffs applied by Latin American countries. It is possible that because these 
CUs have not been fully implemented, this has affected their results, but this may not be the case 
in agreements involving Arab League nations. For instance, the Gulf Cooperation Council was 
formed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman in 2003 under 
                                                 
20 Ludema & Mayda (2013) find that, in the presence of market power, the MFN tariffs of WTO members tends to be 
higher.  
9 
WTO's Article XXIV. CUs created under Article XXIV must have duty-free trade among members 
and common external tariffs that are, on average, not higher than the tariffs applied by member 
countries before the CU was implemented.  
Second, previous studies used data collected during the GATT years (i.e., before the WTO was 
created in 1994). Several countries had to reduce their applied tariffs to conform to the new tariff 
bindings determined during the Uruguay Round of negotiations that led to the creation of the WTO. 
Thus, two distinct situations have arisen depending on the time period: one situation where some 
tariffs were unbounded and the other where the tariffs were not only bounded but had to be 
reduced. This raises questions about whether the applied tariffs decreased because of the 
multilateral negotiations sponsored by the WTO or because of the effects of preferential trade 
agreements. This does not apply to our empirical strategy because we use data from 1998 to 2015; 
therefore, countries have had enough time to adjust their external tariffs in accordance with the 
bound tariffs negotiated under the Uruguay Round.  
Finally, the countries involved in our study are all developing countries; their bound tariffs 
tend to be significantly higher than their applied MFN tariffs. Therefore, we are first to test whether 
the presence of market power is pivotal in determining multilateral tariffs in the presence of 
preferential trade agreements. We can test our results using data at the product level and the 
industry level. Moreover, we can test our results using agreements that involve only developing 
countries as well as agreements that involve both developing and developed countries. In the next 
section, we describe how the data is constructed and provide summary statistics. Section 3 presents 
our econometric methodology, while Section 4 presents our main econometric results and 
discusses robustness tests. In section 5, we conclude. 
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II. Data Description 
a. Overview of Preferential Trade Agreements in the Arab League region 
Since the mid-90s, the Arab League countries have relied more on bilateral and multilateral 
trade agreements that strengthen their economic ties to one another and further develop their trade 
regimes. In Table 1, we present the eleven members of the Arab League considered in our study. 
Table 1 also shows the various trade agreements among these countries. The information in Table 
1 came from the WTO’s RTA database and also includes the list of members involved in each 
RTA. Notice that some members of the Arab League could not be included in our dataset given 
the limited available information about their trade policies. Table 1 shows that among the Arab 
League members considered in this paper, only Lebanon is not a member of the WTO. 21 The table 
also shows that members of the Arab League have several regional trade agreements, with some 
of the most significant agreements involving only members of the Arab League. 
 
 
                                                 
21 Lebanon is an observer in the WTO 
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Table 1-1. Major Preferential Trade Agreements within the Arab League and with Developed Countries 

















Bahrain X X X X   X   5 
United Arab 
Emirates 
X X X X      4 
Kuwait X X X X      4 
Oman X X X X   X   5 
Qatar X X X X      4 
Saudi Arabia X X X X      4 
Morocco X X   X X X X  6 
Tunisia X X   X X  X  5 
Egypt X X   X X  X  5 
Jordan X X   X X X X X 7 
Lebanon  X   X X    3 
       Source: World Trade Organization (WTO)
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The first comprehensive regional trade agreement created by members of the Arab League was 
the Pan-Arab Free Trade Area (PAFTA). This regional trade agreement was formed by 14 
members of the Arab League in 1998 although it has expanded to include an additional 4 members 
of the League since its inception. In line with the primary directives of the Arab League, one of 
the PAFTA’s main provisions is to accelerate removing tariffs and non-tariff barriers on intra-
PAFTA trade24 while strengthening the economic ties of the League with the rest of the world. 
Another plurilateral, regional trade agreement involving only members of the Arab League 
corresponds to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This regional trade agreement was formed 
in 2003, and, as can be seen in Table 1, it involves six members of the Arab League with direct 
access to the Persian Gulf (Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and 
Oman). Notice that the GCC is a CU, thus requiring that its members apply a common external 
tariff, while the PAFTA does not have this requirement. In this case, applying a common external 
tariff among GCC members may not be politically costly given all these economies are 
significantly reliant on specific mineral products (oil and gas). Note that both regional agreements 
were created under WTO’s Article XXIV, indicating that trade among members must be 
significantly duty-free and that average MFN tariffs cannot rise above pre-agreement levels.  
Several agreements among members of the Arab League and other countries have been created 
since PAFTA and the GCC were created. More recently, members of the GCC formed an FTA 
with Singapore. In addition to the plurilateral agreements, specific members of the League have 
also expanded their preferential trade relations to form bilateral agreements with developed 
countries. For instance, Table 1 indicates that the United States has agreements with Bahrain, 
                                                 
24 Full liberalization was scheduled to take place on July 21, 2007. However, the process was accelerated, and tariffs 
were fully removed by 2005. Non-tariff barriers among members was completed by 2010. 
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Jordan, Morocco, and Oman, while the European Union has agreements with Morocco, Tunisia, 
Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, and Lebanon. As a result, our dataset has considerable variation in the type 
of preferential arrangements (FTA versus CU) and in the mix of members involved (developed 
versus developing).  
b. Data sources  
For our empirical analysis, we construct a comprehensive dataset with bilateral information on 
members of the Arab League and their trade partners, which includes information on applied MFN 
tariffs, preferential (bilateral) applied tariffs, and bound tariffs. Preferential tariffs imposed by 
importers equal their MFN tariffs applied on imports from countries where no preferential 
treatment is granted. Information on applied MFN tariffs and preferential tariffs allow us to 
investigate whether forming PTAs among members of the Arab League act as a building block or 
a stumbling block for the multilateral tariffs applied by these countries. As will become clear 
below, our empirical strategy requires information on applied MFN tariffs and preferential tariffs 
over a number of years to better identify the relationship between preferential tariffs and applied 
MFN tariffs. For this reason, we organize a dataset with information on tariffs from 1998 to 2015 
for the eleven Arab League members identified in Table 1. Information on applied MFN tariffs 
and preferential tariffs came from the UNCTAD-TRAINS (Trade Analysis and Information 
Systems) database while information on bound tariffs was provided by the WTO. Information on 
tariffs is organized initially using the 6-digit code of the Harmonized system (HS6), but we also 
aggregate tariff measures using the 4-digit of the International Standard Industry Classification 
(ISIC4, Revision 2). The aggregation procedure used is detailed below.  
Note that the information on PTAs used in this paper include only CUs and FTAs, while we 
disregarded Partial Scope Agreements (PSAs). The information on the PTAs considered in this 
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study can be found in Table 1. PSAs were excluded because it would be challenging to determine 
the degree of market access because only part of the trade between member countries is duty-free. 
Many industries have been excluded from these partial agreements. Our empirical strategy 
involves creating dummy variables to identify if a country-pair is part of the same PTA. We 
implement this strategy by creating two main binary variables: The variable called  PTA equals 
one if a country-pair is part of the same CU or FTA and zero otherwise; the variable CU equals 
one if the country-pair belongs to the same CU and zero otherwise. By including these PTA and 
the CU dummy variables, we can control for cases where countries are members of the same 
preferential trade agreement, as well as control for the type of agreement (FTA versus CU). 
Collecting data on tariffs for different members of the Arab League over the years proved to 
be a challenge because some countries in our sample do not consistently report tariffs. The problem 
of missing observations is common in the literature but is mitigated by following some general 
steps. First, we filled in several missing MFN applied tariffs and preferential tariffs by combining 
information obtained using the UNCTAD-TRAINS dataset with the dataset used in Nicita et al. 
(2018). However, this first step still came up short in filling in many missing preferential tariffs. 
Thus, our second step consists of replacing missing preferential tariffs25 with applied MFN tariffs 
if variable PTA equals zero because, if that is the case, the country-pair in question is not a member 
of any particular preferential trade agreement. Furthermore, our second step also set the 
preferential tariff as equal to zero if MFN is equal to zero and the variable PTA is equal to one. 
Third, we replace preferential tariffs with zero if the value for PTA is one, the current year is higher 
than the phase-out year, and the MFN tariff is not missing.   
                                                 
25 Preferential tariff is the tariff imposed on the exporting country when there is preferential agreement between the 
countries involved and is strictly lower than MFN.  
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Our empirical strategy requires relating the degree of preferential market access to the applied 
MFN tariff. This indicates that we need to aggregate different preferential tariffs described in our 
bilateral trade dataset to a level that shows how they relate to the MFN tariffs, which do not vary 
by trade partner. Thus, we use information on bilateral preferential tariffs and imports to collapse 
the bilateral trade dataset to a dataset with information varying by Arab League importer, product 
(HS6), and year. In this case, we aggregate preferential tariffs by importer, product, and year using 
their average across exporters that belong to the same preferential trade arrangement (or PTA equal 
to one), or using the minimum tariff across exporters rather than the average. However, applied 
MFN tariffs are aggregated at the importer, product, and year level using the median across 
exporters because multilateral tariffs should not vary by trade partner, while we add up trade flows 
across exporters to obtain aggregated import levels26. 
As discussed in the introduction, the degree of flexibility is a fundamental aspect of the trade 
policy adopted by members of the Arab League. As indicated by Nicita et al. (2018), countries 
with flexibility in their tariff schedules may apply tariffs that reflect their market power. To control 
for this possibility, we add the measures of the elasticity of export supply faced by importers 
estimated by Nicita et al. (2018) to our dataset organized using the 6-digit of the Harmonized 
System. We can then control for the degree of market power of the Arab League importers using 
the distribution of the non-cooperative optimal tariffs, which is given by the inverse of the elasticity 
of export supply faced by importers.  
Note that one of the objectives of our study is to compare our results to other studies in the 
literature. For this reason, we also aggregate our dataset using the 4-digit code of the ISIC 
                                                 
26 After aggregation, our dataset still omitted a number of preferential tariffs from the bilateral, product, and year level 
to an importer, product, and year level. We inferred values for missing preferential tariffs by using averages of those 
tariffs by country, HS4, and year in addition to using averages by country, HS2, and year. This procedure was followed 
when the importer-product-year observation presents at least one preferential partner in the bilateral trade data. 
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(Revision 2). Applied MFN tariffs, preferential tariffs, and bound tariffs were aggregated using a 
simple average of the 6-digit codes of the HS that belong to a particular industry at the 4-digit of 
the ISIC. Instead, we use the median value of the elasticity of export supply faced by importers 
across the 6-digit codes of the HS that belong to the same industry at the 4-digit of the ISIC 
following the procedure used in Bown & Crowley (2013).  
Once we convert our data to the ISIC 4-digit codes, we construct additional variables to use 
for our benchmark and robustness results. For instance, it is widely accepted that tariff preferences 
(i.e., the difference between applied MFN tariff and preferential tariffs) are economically 
meaningful if preferential access is significant. We calculated a binary (dummy) variable MRG 
that equals one if the preferential margin, measured in this case using the average bilateral 
preferential tariffs, is greater than or equal to 2.5 percentage points. Likewise, we obtain another 
variable that we label MRG1, which equals one if the preference margin, which uses preferential 
tariffs measured using the minimum bilateral preferential tariff, is greater than or equal to 2.5 
percentage points. To capture the degree of flexibility in tariff schedules, we construct another 
dummy variable to indicate the existence of tariff water27. We label this variable BIND; it equals 
one if the difference between bound tariffs and applied MFN tariffs is less than or equal to 3 
percentage points. This variable can be used to test the effects of preferential trade on MFN tariffs 
when member countries can increase their MFN tariffs on non-members.     
c. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports summary statistics of the main variables we use in our study. Overall, Panel A 
indicates that the average applied MFN (preferential) tariff is about 12.32 (7.29) percentage points 
over the whole period. Likewise, Panel A of Table 1 suggests that the average preferential tariff 
                                                 
27 The difference between bound tariffs and applied most favored nation tariff. 
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based on minimum bilateral tariffs is 5.92 percentage points over the period under consideration. 
This indicates that the average preference margin ranges between 5 percentage points and 6.4 
percentage points depending on how we measure preferential tariffs. Notice that the average bound 
tariff is 37 percent, indicating the presence of significant tariff water in our sample, with only 12 
percent of tariffs deemed close enough to their bindings.  
Notice that in Table 2, the variable MRG suggests that 60 percent of our sample has preference 
margins greater than or equal to 2.5 percentage points, and, similarly, the variable MRG1 suggests 
that 66 percent of the sample has preference margins greater than or equal to 2.5 percentage points. 
As indicated above, satisfying the Rules of Origin28 established by an RTA can be costly and, 
therefore, if the preferential margin is not significant, countries would prefer to export using the 
MFN regime. Notice that restricting the sample to observations with significant preferential 
margins (i.e., MRG variable equals one) led to an average increase of 13 percentage points in MFN 






                                                 
28 Rules of Origin (RoOs) represent the criteria used to determine whether a good exported by one RTA member is 
eligible for duty free access in another member country's market 
(https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/roi_e/roi_info_e.htm). In the case of FTAs, member countries can apply 
different external tariffs, which creates an incentive to import a product through the low-tariff member country and 
re-export it to the high-tariff member country. For example, a country can import a good at 5% and export it to another 
country at 15%. To prevent duty-free transshipments, RoOs support independent tariff setting under FTAs. Anson et 
al. (2005) show that satisfying RoOs imply substantial compliance costs. In their paper, they argue that firms may 
decide not to rely on the preferential export regime if the preferential margin (difference between MFN and preferential 
tariff) is not greater than 2.5%; thus, preferential margins are meaningful if they are greater than 2.5%.     
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            Table 1-2. Descriptive Statistics 
         
Source: Author using data from the UNCTAD-TRAINS, WTO, and Nicita et al. (2018) 
 
 
𝑨: 𝑭𝒖𝒍𝒍 𝑺𝒂𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆 
 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
MFN 14178 12.32 15.65 0.00 5.00 5.00 15.00 200.00 
avgpref 14174 7.29 12.93 0.00 0.14 2.86 8.38 200.00 
L_avgpref 14178 8.24 13.52 0.00 0.30 4.00 10.00 200.00 
minpref 14174 5.92 12.02 0.00 0.00 1.37 5.47 200.00 
L_minpref 14178 6.89 12.76 0.00 0.08 2.25 7.10 200.00 
bound 12746 37.2 47.71 0.38 14.92 26.52 40.00 2145.71 
BIND 14178 0.12 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
L_BIND 14178 0.14 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
optimal 12054 0.13 0.46 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.11 10.05 
MRG 14178 0.60 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MRG1 14178 0.66 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
𝑩. 𝑺𝒂𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒊𝒏 ≥ 𝟐. 𝟓 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
MFN 8567 13.01 16.13 2.5 5.00 5.00 16.45 200.00 
avgpref 8563 4.82 10.43 0.00 0.00 0.50 5.24 160.83 
L_avgpref 8567 6.51 12.01 0.00 0.04 1.59 7.57 180.00 
bound 8056 38.6 42.77 5.00 15.00 30.00 40.01 2145.71 
BIND 8567 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
L_BIND 8567 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
optimal 7175 0.14 0.50 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.11 10.05 
𝑪. 𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝑪𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒎𝒔 𝑼𝒏𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒐𝒏𝒍𝒚 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
MFN 7437 6.94 12.29 0.00 4.83 5.00 5.00 125.00 
Avgpref 7435 1.67 6.39 0.00 0.00 0.11 1.43 125.00 
L_avgpref 7437 1.67 6.24 0.00 0.00 0.09 1.54 125.00 
Minpref 7435 1.45 6.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 1.05 125.00 
L_minpref 7437 1.44 5.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.08 125.00 
bound 7275 35.44 37.55 0.38 13.74 15.00 35.00 200.00 
BIND 7437 0.09 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
L_BIND 7437 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
MRG 7437 0.67 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MRG1 7437 0.70 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
optimal 5618 0.16 0.39 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.14 5.85 
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Furthermore, Table 2 shows the aggregate figures in panel A differ from panel C, indicating 
that, for the members of the Arab League, customs unions may lead to different levels of applied 
MFN and preference margins than FTAs. Panel C suggests that applied MFN tariffs are much 
lower than the measures found on Panel A, averaging about 7 percentage points, while preferential 
tariffs using different methods also seem to be significantly lower under a customs union, 
averaging between 1.5 and 2 percentage points. In the case of a customs union, the average 
preference margins are 5.27 percentage points for MRG, and 5.52 percentage points for MRG1, 
while 9 percent of the applied MFN tariffs are constrained by tariff bindings29.  
The fundamental differences between panels A and C is related to the fact that North African 
countries have been members of the GATT for several decades, and thus, many of them had the 
flexibility to set high applied MFN tariffs and very high tariff bounds because of the enabling 
clause. However, many GCC countries were never members of the GATT, and once they became 
members of the WTO, their external tariffs had to be closer to their relatively lower tariff bounds. 
Historically, the GCC countries have maintained low external tariff barriers because of their 
narrow production base and their oil wealth. Furthermore, the customs union formed in 2003 
brought even further declines in their overall external tariffs, requiring common external tariffs of 
5 percent on most imported goods and zero percent on essential goods30.  
Our dataset suggests that members of the Arab League may have, at least on average, promoted 
intra-trade flows among members of its regional trade agreements without explicitly discouraging 
trade with non-member countries. Thus, we find a positive correlation between MFN tariffs and 
preferential tariffs where a downward trend for both sequences is present. As Figure 1 shows, the 
                                                 
29 See Appendix A for information on minimum tariffs. 
30 World Bank Middle East and North Africa Region October 2010 “economic Integration in the GCC” 
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initial average external tariff was about 27 percentage points, and, in 2015, it dropped to about 9 
percentage points. Likewise, the 1998 average preferential tariff was about 24 percentage points 
and fell to 2 percentage points in 2015, the last year from which we collected data.  
Figure 1-1. Overall Average MFN, Average and Minimum Preferential Tariffs 
 
 
Source: data taken from the UNCTAD-TRAINS and WTO 
 
These tariff adjustments were achieved through a series of steps that involved reducing 
maximum multilateral tariffs as well as reducing the preferential tariffs encouraged by RTAs. For 
example, the average MFN tariff applied by Morocco declined from 33 percentage points in 2000, 
when the Morocco-EU FTA took effect, to 28 percentage points in 2005. In 2006, the average 
MFN tariff applied by Morocco was 27 percentage points, but by 2015, it fell to 14 percentage 
points. During this latter period, Morocco formed two additional bilateral RTAs, one with the 
United States and the other with Turkey, both in 2006. Morocco’s average preferential tariffs 
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find similar evidence for members of the GCC, which succeeded in reducing common external 
tariffs from an average of 12 percentage points in 1999 to 5 percentage points in 2015.  Thus, we 
find evidence of a correlation between external (MFN) and preferential tariffs. However, that does 
not imply causality. Our econometric strategy, described below, explores the causality issue with 
a well-founded statistical approach.  
III. Econometric Methodology  
In the introduction, we discussed several empirical strategies for investigating the effects of 
different features of the international trade system (preferential trade agreements, market power, 
and tariff overhang, among others) on multilateral tariffs. We will rely on those empirical models 
as guidelines to help us analyze the relationship between these features and applied MFN tariffs.  
Table 1 shows that Arab League countries are involved in various preferential trade 
agreements, and, as a result, tariff preferences granted by each of these countries may vary across 
preferential partners. Thus, our econometric model relies on two major approaches to address the 
degree of preferential access granted by members of the Arab League. The first method calculates 
the simple average preferential tariff applied by an importing country. This approach is inspired 
by empirical work that usually measures trade barriers using the simple average of tariffs. 31 The 
second method relies on the minimum preferential tariff as in Estevadeordal et al. (2008). The 








𝑃 }    ,      (1) 
                                                 
31 Kee et al. (2008) indicate that using average MFN tariffs can be quite misleading because these measures can differ 
significantly from a welfare-concerned measure of trade restrictiveness. Moreover, average tariffs may vary widely 
depending on how the averages are constructed.  
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where 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑃  denotes the preferential tariff (in percentage points) applied by country j on imports 
from preferential partner P in sector i at year t. Our empirical model explicates the effects of two 
key features of the trade policy implemented by Arab League countries on applied MFN tariffs. 
On one hand, we want to investigate the effects of preferential access on applied MFN tariffs while, 
on the other hand, we consider how the flexibility in these countries’ tariff schedules affect their 
application of market power in setting tariffs. To investigate the effects of RTAs on multilateral 
tariffs, our benchmark specification uses the following empirical model:  
𝑀𝐹𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗𝑖 + 𝜃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡       , and       (2) 
𝑀𝐹𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗𝑖 + 𝜃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡       ,              (3) 
where 𝑴𝑭𝑵𝒊𝒋𝒕 represents the non-discriminatory tariff applied by importing country j on imports 
of sector i. As indicated above, our benchmark results aggregate tariffs at the industry level using 
the 4-digit the ISIC, but we also test our predictions using data aggregated at a much finer level 
(6-digit of the HS), in which case subscript i should be understood as a product rather than an 
industry or sector. The explanatory variables 𝒂𝒗𝒈𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒊𝒋𝒕 and 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒊𝒋𝒕 are defined by 
expression (1), and empirical models (2) and (3) explore the differences between these two 
measures of preferential access.  
Many other factors other than preferential tariffs can affect a country’s external tariffs. For 
instance, macroeconomic shocks, political economy, and historical considerations could also 
affect multilateral tariffs. Ideally, we would like to introduce variables to control for all these 
factors, but, in practice, information (for instance) on industry-level capital-labor ratios and 
political organization are not systematically available across these countries. Thus, we control for 
these additional factors by introducing country-industry denoted by 𝜶𝒋𝒊 and country-year fixed 
effects denoted by 𝜽𝒋𝒕 in expressions (2) and (3). The term 𝝐𝒊𝒋𝒕 denotes the error term. 
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The coefficient of interest in specifications (2) and (3) is 𝜷𝟏. A positive and statistically 
significant 𝜷𝟏would support the building block effect of preferential trade on multilateral tariffs. 
A positive sign for 𝛽1 indicates that as countries lower their preferential tariffs, they also tend to 
lower their MFN tariffs. On the other hand, a negative value for 𝛽1 would lend support to the idea 
that preferential trade agreements represent a stumbling block to multilateral trade liberalization. 
As indicated in the introduction, other articles have reported different results over time, but we are 
better equipped to shed light on this issue because of our ability to test this question using data 
with different aggregation levels, RTAs of different types, and preferences exchanges between 
countries with different economic development status.  
Furthermore, we test how flexibility in the tariff schedules of the Arab League members 
affected their multilateral tariffs. In particular, the introduction refers to several articles suggesting 
that flexibility in setting tariffs may lead countries to exercise their market power. In this case, we 
expect tariffs to be higher if the market power of the importing country is high. To test this 
hypothesis, we use the following specifications: 
𝑀𝐹𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗𝑖 + 𝜃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑊𝑅𝑖𝑗) + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡  , and      (4) 
𝑀𝐹𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗𝑖 + 𝜃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑊𝑅𝑖𝑗) + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡  ,             (5) 
where variable 𝑷𝑾𝑹𝒊𝒋 is a binary variable equaling one if the inverse of the elasticity of export 
supply faced by country j in sector i is greater than a certain cutoff (the 67th, 70th, and 75th 
percentile) of the distribution of market power for country j's sectors. This approach follows Broda 
et al. (2008), Nicita et al. (2018), among others, who use the distribution of market power to 
determine products or industries where power is more relevant. In this case, our prior assumption 
is that coefficient 𝛽2 should be negative, suggesting that the potential building block effect of 
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preferential tariffs tend to be lower, or even become a stumbling block, for products where the 
importer has greater market power relative to products with lower market power.32  
We test several extensions to specifications (2) through (5). First, we also use the lagged 
average (minimum) preferential tariffs as our main explanatory variable, showing that our results 
are robust to the presence of predetermined preferential tariffs. Second, Ornelas (2007) and 
Facchini et al. (2013) model different types of PTAs and show that external tariffs under an FTA 
may be lower than under a CU. Because Arab League members have different types of agreements 
with other members, including FTAs like the PanArab FTA, and a CU, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, we test whether external tariffs under an FTA are affected differently by preferential 
tariffs than under a CU. This objective is achieved by extending expressions (2) and (3) with an 
additional explanatory variable representing the interaction between variable 𝒂𝒗𝒈𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒊𝒋𝒕 
(𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒊𝒋𝒕) and a dummy indicating whether importing country j is part of a CU at year t. If the 
coefficient of this variable is statistically significant, then we can conclude that external tariffs 
under an FTA are not affected by preferential tariffs in the same way as external tariffs under a 
CU.  
We use specifications (2) through (5) to investigate the effects of preferential tariffs on applied 
MFN tariffs. Our basic strategy relies on OLS estimates of these specifications. However, the 
literature suggests that different sources of endogeneity might bias our estimates. First, Limao 
(2006), Ketterer et al. (2014), and Estevedeordal et al. (2008) indicate that applied MFN tariffs 
and negotiated tariff bounds may affect preferential tariffs. Moreover, Broda et al. (2008), Ludema 
& Mayda (2013), and Nicita et al. (2018) posits that tariffs may not only affect the degree of market 
                                                 
32 Notice that power does not vary by year. As such, variable  𝑷𝑾𝑹𝒊𝒋 is absorbed by country-industry fixed effects.  
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power, but missing controls for political economy factors correlated with market power may bias 
estimates of the effects of power on applied MFN tariffs.  
To address potential endogeneity, we use 2SLS and GMM instrumental variable strategies with 
two different sets of instrumental variables. The first set uses the average or the minimum 
preferential tariffs of regional trading partners, and the same strategy was followed to obtain the 
instruments for the variable avgpref as it interacted with the power dummy; for the second set of 
instrumental variables, we chose a main trading partner (among members of the Arab League) by 
region and uses the main partner's preferential tariff as the instrument. Members of the Arab 
League fall into two regions: (i) North Africa, which includes Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, 
and Jordan; and (ii) the Gulf Cooperation Council, which includes the United Arab Emirates, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, and Bahrain. The main partner of each Arab League country is 
chosen using the highest correlation of preferential tariffs between two members within a region.33 
We use tests to verify the quality of our instruments, including tests for weak instruments and tests 
to check that our instruments are orthogonal to the error term34.  
 
IV. Estimation Results and Robustness Tests 
a. Results 
Table 3 reports the results of estimating equations (2) and (3). As discussed, our dependent 
variable corresponds to the applied MFN tariffs expressed in percentage points, and the key 
                                                 
33 Note that preferential tariffs each country grants to its partners may differ, but they correlate highly within the same 
trading block because member countries tend to reciprocate any preferential tariffs (Estevadeordal et al., 2008). 
 
34 Our instruments are orthogonal to the error term because since the countries exchange preferential access, it is 
expected that preferences, for example, granted by Morocco to be positively correlated with the tariffs Egypt 
implement. However, we do not have a clear link between the preferential tariffs in Egypt with the MFN tariffs 
applied by Morocco except through preferential tariffs. Therefore, we believe that the instruments are orthogonal to 
the error term. 
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independent variable is the preferential tariff measured using the average and minimum 
preferential tariffs. All regressions shown in Table 3 include country-industry and country-year 
fixed effects to control for macroeconomic and political economy factors. Our standard errors are 
clustered at the country-industry level.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 show the results of estimates using equation (2) for Column 1 and 
equation (3) for Column 2 using ordinary least squares (OLS). Thus, the results shown in columns 
(1) and (2) measure the correlation between preferential tariffs and applied MFN tariffs. The 
positive and statistically significant coefficient on avgpref in Column 1 and on minpref in Column 
2, show that preferential tariffs have a building block effect on multilateral tariffs. The coefficients 
described in Column 1 (2) indicate that a one percentage point decrease in the average (minimum) 
preferential tariffs leads to a reduction in external tariffs of 0.479 (0.083) percentage points.  
As mentioned in the previous section, our model may suffer from endogeneity. We tested for 
endogeneity using the Haussman test and confirm that endogenous explanatory variables are 
present in our specifications. As a result, we run the equivalents of columns 1 and 2 in columns 3 
and 4 using a GMM-based instrumental variables approach.  As discussed in the previous section, 
the instruments used to estimate the specifications shown in Column 3 of Table 3 corresponds to 
the average preferential tariffs of regional partners and Column 4 corresponds to the minimum 
preferential tariffs of regional partners. Controlling for endogeneity creates a stronger building 
block effect than the building block effect using OLS. The coefficients in columns 3 and 4 are 
positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficients shown in Column 3 
suggest that a one percentage point reduction in preferential tariffs lead to a decrease of 0.67 in 
MFN tariffs, and the coefficients in Column 4 lead to a decrease of 0.44 percentage points in MFN 
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tariffs.35 Please note the p-value of the Kleibergen-Paap LM test indicates that our instruments are 
strong, while the p-value of Hansen J over-identification statistic indicates that our instruments are 
orthogonal to the error term (Table 3 shows both statistics). 
Columns 5 and 6 in Table 3 show the OLS estimation results equivalent to columns 1 and 2 
where we use lagged values of the variables avgpref and minpref. This strategy allows us to control 
for the possibility that preferential tariffs may be predetermined relative to MFN. This strategy 
may also partly address concerns with endogeneity. The results in columns 5 and 6 show that the 
coefficient on preferential tariffs is positive and statistically significant, again lending support for 
the building block effect of preferential agreements on multilateral trade policy. The specifications 
estimated in columns 7 through 10 use instrumental variable approaches to control for any 
endogeneity issues remaining in the estimates shown in columns 5 and 6.  
In particular, the specifications estimated in columns 7 and 8 rely on a 2SLS instrumental 
variable approach, while the specifications estimated in columns 9 and 10 rely on a GMM-based 
instrumental variable approach. Both approaches provide broadly similar conclusions about the 
building block effect of preferential trade on multilateral tariffs. For instance, the results shown in 
Column 7 suggest that a decrease of one percentage point on the average preferential tariffs reduces 
the applied MFN tariff by 0.49 percentage points, more than the 0.337 percentage points obtained 
using OLS in Column 5. Similarly, the results shown in Column 8 using minimum preferential 
tariffs show similar support for the building block hypothesis. 
                                                 
35 The partial R-squares from the first stage regressions are 0.12 for Column 3 and 0.04 for Column 4, and the F-test 
rejects the hypothesis that the excluded instruments are equal to zero at the 1 percent significance level (the first stage 
results are reported in Appendix A 2). 
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avgpref 0.479***  0.666***          
 (0.0322)  (0.105)          
minpref  0.083***  0.443***         
  (0.0127)  (0.0886)         
L_avgpref     0.337***  0.490***  0.506***  0.477***  
     (0.0251)  (0.0948)  (0.0927)  (0.128)  
L_minpref      0.237***  0.339***  0.355***  0.381*** 
      (0.0436)  (0.0806)  (0.0714)  (0.110) 
             
Constant 8.863*** 12.06*** 7.410*** 9.868** 9.828*** 10.97*** 8.574*** 10.27*** 8.447*** 10.16*** 9.023*** 10.28*** 
 (0.251) (0.0841) (0.816) (0.534) (0.206) (0.302) (0.780) (0.557) (0.763) (0.493) (1.051) (0.753) 
             
















             
Kleibergen-Paap rk 
LM Statistic 

















Observations 15,238 15,238 14,999 14,999 14,178 14,178 13,945 13,945 13,945 13,945 8,478 9,321 
Notes: Country-industry and country-year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the country-
industry level. P-values are reported in brackets.  
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. 
 
 
                                                 
36 Avg: average. 
37 Min: minimum. 
38 RoO: Rules of Origin. 
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To test for efficiency in our 2SLS estimators, we check for heteroscedasticity 39 and we find 
that the estimated error terms of our estimates in columns 7 and 8 display this particular 
characteristic. We use a GMM-based instrumental variable approach in columns 9 and 10 and 
confirm the building block effect of preferential tariffs on MFN applied tariffs. The presence of 
heteroscedasticity in the error terms led us to adopt the GMM-based approach to control for 
possible endogeneity concerns onwards. As such, columns 11 and 12 of Table 3 show the GMM-
based estimation results using equations (2) and (3) while eliminating any observations from our 
dataset for which the preference margin is less than 2.5 percentage points. This is an important test 
of robustness because small preferential margins should have little to no impact on trade flows in 
the presence of significant compliance costs of rules of origin. We expected that constraining our 
data to include only cases with significant preference margins would generate more profound 
effects on the external tariff reduction. However, the results shown in columns 11 and 12 do not 
suggest a greater building block effect than the results suggest in columns 9 and 10. 
As explained in the description of our dataset, the Arab League members have different types 
of trade agreements, including different FTAs and a CU. The literature suggests that common 
external tariffs under CUs are higher than external tariffs under FTAs because CUs require 
coordinating external tariffs, where the interests of the different partner members are clearly 
internalized while FTAs require setting tariffs independently. In Table 4, we interact the variable 
measuring preferential tariffs with a binary variable (CUdum) to indicate whether the importing 
country is part of a CU (i.e., Gulf Cooperation Council). Moreover, Table 4 shows the robustness 
of some of our results to different instrumental variables. We also test our results by applying 
                                                 
39 We use the command “ivhettest” in stata to test for the presence of heteroscedasticity.  
30 
 
instruments based on the main partner approach, not the regional averages as done in Table 3. The 
first two columns in Table 4 show the results of estimating specifications using equations (2) and 
(3) with the addition of the interaction between preferential tariffs and the CUdum variable using 
OLS. The coefficient on the lagged preferential tariff (L_avgpref and L_minpref), is positive and 
statistically significant, which indicates again a building block effect of tariff preferences on 
applied MFN tariffs. These results are similar to the results shown in Table 3. 
The impact of preferential tariffs under a CU is the sum of the coefficient for the variable 
measuring preferential tariffs and the coefficient of its interaction with the binary variable for the 
presence of CUs (L_avgprefCUdum and L_minprefCUdum). The results shown in columns 1 and 
2 suggest that preferential tariffs under a CU also have a building block effect although the building 








                                                 
40 We exclude the CU dummy variable from both regressions in columns 1 and 2 because it is perfectly collinear with 
country-year fixed effects.  
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L_avgpref 0.358***  0.483***  0.520***  0.459***  
 (0.025)  (0.067)  (0.099)  (0.153)  
L_avgprefCUdum -0.103**  0.164  -0.035  0.160  
 (0.052)  (0.101)  (0.127)  (0.227)  
         
L_minpref  0.243***  0.336***  0.345***  0.308*** 
  (0.047)  (0.049)  (0.066)  (0.106) 
L_minprefCUdum  -0.044  0.213*  0.140  0.692 
  (0.058)  (0.123)  (0.211)  (0.706) 
Constant 9.748*** 10.96*** 8.492*** 10.14*** 8.366*** 10.13*** 9.063*** 10.29*** 
 (0.204) (0.312) (0.579) (0.374) (0.743) (0.447) (1.088) (0.775) 
         









         






 2.11  
[0.14] 
         












         












         
Observations 14,178 14,178 13,945 13,945 11,266 11,266 7607 8268 
Notes: Country-industry and country-year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses adjusted for clustering 
at the country-industry level. P-values are reported in brackets.  
  ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. 
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The results in Table 3 highlight the presence of estimation biases due to endogeneity as well 
as the presence of estimated errors with heteroscedasticity. As a result, we estimate the same 
specifications in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 using the GMM-based instrumental variable approach. 
Results show that our main coefficients of interest are positive, which may suggest that tariff 
preferences under CUs may have a building block effect greater than FTAs as shown in columns 
1 and 2. However, the coefficient of the interaction between preferential tariffs and the dummy 
indicating the presence of a CU is not consistently significant statistically. We interpret these 
results as indicating that preferential tariffs under a CU have a similar building block effect as an 
FTA.  
In columns 5 and 6, we tested the sensitivity of our results using instrumental variables based 
on the main partner approach. The results shown in columns 5 and 6 indicate that preferential 
tariffs under CUs have a similar, and statistically significant, building block effect as FTAs. These 
results confirm the results in columns 3 and 4. Moreover, the quality of the instrumental variables 
seem good using either of the strategies in columns 3 through 6 with the exception of the borderline 
orthogonality test in column 5. In columns 7 and 8, we estimate the same specifications in columns 
5 and 6 using only observations with preferential margins greater than or equal to 2.5 percentage 
points. The results in columns 7 and 8 confirm that Arab League CUs and FTAs tend to generate 
an economically similar building block effect on multilateral tariffs. 
Our findings agree with Estevadeordal et al. (2008) and Ketterer et al. (2014) in that FTAs 
generate a building block effect on multilateral tariffs. On the other hand, our results differ from 
Estevadeordal et al. (2008) in that we find that both CUs and FTAs generate similar building block 
effects. One possible explanation for this difference is that the Gulf Cooperation Council was 
formed under Article XXIV, while the CUs in Estevaderodal et al. (2008) were formed under the 
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Enabling Clause. This indicates that the members of the CUs in Estevadeordal el al. (2008) have 
much more flexibility in setting external tariffs and in the degree of internal liberalization than 
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
As discussed above, a key characteristic of the trade policy implemented by members of the 
Arab League is its degree of flexibility. In essence, countries in the Arab League can usually 
increase their applied MFN tariffs significantly (see Table 2) without violating their WTO 
obligations. We thus test the potential importance of WTO’s binding tariffs because the difference 
between bound tariffs and applied MFN tariffs may affect potential adjustments of applied MFN 
tariffs. In Table 5, we test how flexibility in the trade policies of these countries affect their 
multilateral tariffs. In columns 1 through 6 we test whether having adequate policy space to 
increase tariffs changes how preferential tariffs affect applied MFN tariffs. To achieve this 
objective, we extend specification (1) by including a dummy variable BIND, which is equal to one 
when the difference between the value of the bound tariffs and applied MFN tariffs is less than a 
certain threshold. In columns 1 and 2, we use a threshold of 5 percent, while in columns 3 and 4, 
we use a threshold of 3 percent. In columns 5 and 6, we use a threshold of 1 percent. We then 
provide OLS estimates in columns 1, 3, and 5, while in columns 2, 4, and 6, we use the GMM-
based approach. The results in columns 2, 4, and 6 suggest that the coefficient for the variable 
BIND, and for its interaction with the lagged value of preferential tariffs, is not statistically 
significant41. Moreover, our preferred specification, found in Column 9 of Table 3, is statistically 




                                                 
41 In all cases, the GMM results failed the weak instrument test. 
42 Also, using the Akaike’s information criterion and the Basian information criterion, the model without the binary 
variable BIND fits the data better. 
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Table 1-5. Features of Trade Policy Setting and their effect on Preferential Trade Liberalization 
MFN 
𝑩𝑰𝑵𝑫 ≤ 𝟓% 𝑩𝑰𝑵𝑫 ≤ 𝟑% 𝑩𝑰𝑵𝑫 ≤ 𝟏% 67th Percentile 70th Percentile 75th Percentile 
OLS     GMM OLS     GMM OLS     GMM OLS     GMM OLS     GMM OLS     GMM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
L_avgpref 0.337*** 0.265** 0.338*** 0.293** 0.337*** 0.271** 0.350*** 0.665*** 0.348*** 0.650*** 0.349*** 0.590*** 
  (0.027) (0.113) (0.027) (0.128) (0.027) (0.111) (0.025) (0.138) (0.026) (0.131) (0.025) (0.127) 
L_avgprefBND -0.045* 0.367 -0.038* 0.258 -0.044* 0.322             
  (0.025) (0.341) (0.023) (0.345) (0.025) (0.302)             
L_BIND 3.479*** 3.396 2.801*** 6.583 3.445*** 5.239             
  (0.599) (14.90) (0.488) (12.57) (0.599) (15.20)             
L_avgprefPWR             0.029 -0.432** 0.035 -0.401** 0.042 -0.310* 
              (0.031) (0.196) (0.031) (0.176) (0.049) (0.179) 
                          
9.610*** 9.451*** 9.524*** 8.717*** 9.609*** 9.323*** 9.646*** 8.319*** 9.650*** 8.256*** 9.647*** 8.397*** 
  (0.22) (1.08) (0.22) (1.46) (0.22) (1.08) (0.19) (0.86) (0.19) (0.87) (0.20) (0.89) 
                        
Test: L_avgpref + 
L_avgprefBND =0 
106.16 4.33 118.28 3.88 106.07 4.76             
[0.00] [0.04] [0.00] [0.05] [0.00] [0.03]             
                        
Test: L_avgpref + 
L_avgprefPWR =0 
            148.01 2.74 145.81 3.27 114.68 3.43 
            [0.00] [0.09] [0.00] [0.07] [0.00] [0.06] 
                          
Hansen J-Statistic   3.146   2.956   3.416   0.605   0.616   1.819 
    [0.36]   [0.39]   [0.33]   [0.74]   [0.73]   [0.40] 
                          
Kleibergen-Paap rk 
LM Statistic 
  9.155   7.445   6.207   24.056   26.753   35.245 
  [0.06]   [0.11]   [0.18]   [0.00]   [0.00]   [0.00] 
                          
Observations 14,178 13,945 14,178 13,945 14,178 13,945 12,054 11,749 12,054 11,749 12,054 11,749 
Notes: Country-industry and country-year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the country-
industry level. P-values are reported in brackets.  
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
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In columns 7 to 12, we test if market power affects how preferential tariffs change multilateral 
tariffs. To achieve this objective, we estimate specification using Equation (3) using a dummy 
variable (PWR) that indicates observations where the importer has high market power. More 
specifically, PWR is equal to one if the inverse of the export supply elasticity faced by importers 
in a particular industry is higher than the 67th, 70th, and 75th percentiles of the distribution of inverse 
elasticity (market power) by importing country. In Columns 7, we estimate our model using OLS, 
and in Column 8, we estimate our model using GMM, while measuring the dummy variable PWR 
based on the 67th percentile of this distribution. Similarly, in columns 9 and 10, we use the 70th 
percentile of the distribution, while in columns 11 and 12, we use the 75th percentile.  
The results shown in columns 7 through 12 indicate that the coefficient of L_avgpref is always 
positive and significant at the 1 percent level. This suggests that preferential tariffs have a strong 
building block effect when an importer of goods has low market power. However, the GMM-based 
estimates suggest that the coefficient of the interaction between preferential tariff and market 
power (L_avgprefPWR) is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the building block 
effect is not as high for products where the importer has more market power. For example, in 
Column 10, a one percentage point decrease in preferential tariff leads to a 0.65 percentage point 
decrease in MFN tariffs when the importing country shows low market power. However, when an 
importing country has high levels of market power, a one percentage point decrease in preferential 
tariff leads to a 0.249 percentage point decrease in MFN tariffs. Basically, market power mitigates 
the building block effect. Thus, our estimates suggest that the building block effect of preferential 




b. Robustness Analysis 
Table 6 shows results of a series of robustness tests for our main findings. First, we test whether 
the results are robust across different aggregation levels. Notice that WTO members negotiate and 
report tariffs at the product level, which corresponds to the 6-digit level of the HS. In Tables 3-5, 
we rely on average tariffs calculated at the industry level (ISIC) to represent the degree of external 
liberalization and this approach may introduce biases as explained in Kee et al. (2008). 
Furthermore, our measures of market power are originally estimated at the 6-digit level of the HS 
by Nicita et al. (2018). Differing results in the literature show that aggregation levels may help 
explain multilateral tariffs applied across countries. For example, Limão (2006), using data at the 
8-digit level of the HS, finds a stumbling block effect from U.S. PTAs on bound tariffs negotiated 
by the U.S., while Estevadeordal et al. (2008) find that PTAs formed by Latin American countries 
do have a building block effect on their applied MFN tariffs. Interestingly, Ludema & Mayda 
(2013) find that forming PTAs does have a building block effect at the product level (6-digit level 
of the HS), but not at the industry level (4-digit level of the ISIC).  
Thus, we investigate the robustness of our results for different data aggregation levels by 
estimating specification (2) using data at the product level (6-digit level of the HS). In addition,  
we test the robustness of our results by estimating equation (2) while controlling for product fixed 
effects that vary by year (HS6 x year). This augmented specification controls for the potential 
presence of sensitive products, those products whose characteristics are similarly important across 
countries. The results of estimating these specifications can be found in columns 1 and 2 and 3 and 
4 of Table 6, respectively.  
Table 6 also reports the robustness of our results in the presence of heterogeneous trade policy, 
as that policy is related to the degree of commitment of Arab League countries during WTO 
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negotiations. As mentioned in the previous section, North African countries, as well as some 
Middle Eastern countries, are old WTO members, which indicates that they can set very high 
bound tariffs based on the Enabling Clause, while other members of the league with access to the 
Persian Gulf are new WTO members, and, therefore, faced more demanding constraints in joining 
the WTO. We test how important this type of heterogenity is by using product level data (6-digit 
level of the HS) and industry level data (4-digit level of the ISIC). The results can be found in 
columns 5 through 12.  
We have highlighted throughout this paper the degree of flexibility enjoyed by Arab League 
members in setting applied tariffs while still complying with WTO rules. They have significant 
leeway to set applied MFN tariffs given the presence of high levels of tariff waters on their tariff 
schedules (see Table 2). Thus, multilateral tariffs may also reflect their degree of market power 
(see Table 5). We test whether market power matters in setting tariffs for Arab League members 
(see columns 1 through 6 in Table 7). We use product-level data to estimate specifications using 
Equation (2) and define the presence of high-degree of market power using different thresholds 
following the strategy adopted in Table 5.    
The econometric results in Table 6 confirm all previous results in tables 3 through 5. All 
specifications used in tables 6 and 7 follow the same GMM-based instrumental variable approach 
used in previous tables, as well as the instrumental variables used. Columns 1 and 2 confirm 
preferential agreements had a building block effect on multilateral tariffs for Arab League 
members at the product level. This can be verified because the coefficient for preferential tariffs is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Economically speaking, the results 
suggest that a one percentage point decrease in preferential tariffs leads to a 0.96 (0.90) percentage 
point decrease in MFN tariffs in column 1 (2). These results suggest that the building block effect 
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from forming PTAs is much higher when using product-level data than industry-level data; a 
comparison with column 9 (10) of Table 3 indicates this conclusion.  
The results shown in columns 3 and 4 include an additional set of fixed effects (industry-year) 
and strongly confirm the building block effect. However, controlling for an additional set of fixed 
effects is very demanding, and, as a result, our results suggest that our instruments may not be 
orthogonal to error terms as desired. Columns 5 through 12 focus on possible heterogeneity in 
multilateral trade policies of old versus new WTO members. Columns 5 and 6 show results using 
data for GCC countries at the industry level, while columns 7 and 8 report the results for the same 
subsample using data at the product level. The coefficient in column 5 (6) is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level, so a one percentage point reduction in preferential 
tariffs at the industry level for GCC countries reduced external tariffs to 0.52 (0.51) percentage 
points. Columns 7 and 8 show a slightly higher building block effect for GCC at the product level. 
We estimate the same specifications for North African countries at the industry level in columns 
9  and 10 and at the product level in columns 11 and 12. These results confirm the building block 
effect for PTAs among North African countries regardless of the degree of aggregation of the data, 
although clearly, the greater building bloc effect for the entire sample, as found in columns 1 
through 4 is driven by results related to countries in North Africa, as can be seen in columns 11 
and 12.  
Finally, columns 1 through 6 in Table 7 show the results of estimating specification (4) where 
we include the interaction of variables avgpref and PWR dummy (avgprefPWR). The PWR 
dummy is measured using the same strategy applied in Table 5; the 67th, 70th, and 75th percentile 
of the distribution of market power were used for each member of the Arab League at the product 
level. The coefficient for avgpref (L_avgpref) is significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that 
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preferential tariffs have strong building block effects on products where the importer has a lower 
degree of market power. This supports our findings in Table 5 where we use data at the industry 
level. Note the coefficient of avgprefPWR (L_avgprefPWR) is negative and statistically 
significant at both the 5 and 10 percent levels, indicating that the building block effect diminishes 
with market power. When controlling for different sources of heterogeneity, the results shown in 








6-digits level 6-digits adding 
industry-year fixed 
effects 
GCC subsample at the 
ISIC level 
GCC subsample at the 
6-digits level 
North Africa 
subsample at the ISIC 
level 
North Africa 
subsample at the 6-
digits level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
avgpref 0.964***  1.587***  0.519***  0.630***  0.427***  0.920***  
 (0.045)  (0.066)  (0.089)  (0.183)  (0.061)  (0.040)  
L_avgpref  0.903***  1.403***  0.514***  0.587***  0.399***  0.869*** 
  (0.045)  (0.057)  (0.069)  (0.164)  (0.064)  (0.037) 
             
             
Constant 4.739*** 4.690*** 0.609 1.119*** 8.560*** 8.384*** 6.950*** 6.935*** 9.258*** 9.311*** 5.039*** 4.950***  
(0.298) (0.318) (0.436) (0.405) (0.694) (0.573) (1.214) (1.172) (0.478) (0.533) (0.270) (0.265) 
 
  











































































































Notes: Country-industry and country-year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and adjusted for clustering at the 
country-industry level. P-values are reported in brackets.  




Table 1-7. Robustness Tests for Baseline Results on the Relationship between MFN and Preferential Tariffs  



















       
avgpref 1.027***  1.029***  1.035***  
 (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.042)  
avgprefPWR -0.027**  -0.031**  -0.027*  
 (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.016)  
       
L_avgpref  1.004***  1.003***  1.012*** 
  (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.042) 
L_avgprefPWR  -0.023*  -0.028**  -0.023* 
  (0.0120)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
Constant 4.311*** 3.956*** 4.297*** 3.974*** 4.232*** 3.883*** 
 (0.285) (0.288) (0.288) (0.295) (0.297) (0.309) 
 

































































Observations 219,942 205,100 219,942 205,100 219,942 205,100 
Notes: Country-industry and country-year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and adjusted for 
clustering at the country-industry level. P-values are reported in brackets. 




V. Conclusion  
In this paper, we report on our investigation of the effects of the different features of the 
international trade system (preferential trade agreements, market power, and bound tariffs) on 
multilateral trade liberalization. Using data at the industry level, we find that as countries grant 
preferential access through FTAs to their regional partners, they also liberalize trade with non-
members. Empirically, our results indicate that a one percentage point decrease in average 
(minimum) preferential tariffs leads to a reduction in external tariffs by about 0.51 (0.36) 
percentage points. Moreover, we find that creating a CU with Arab League members leads to a 
degree of external trade liberalization similar to creating FTAs. This result represents a departure 
from the existing literature, but we interpret this as a natural result of the Arab League creating 
CUs with other members of the league under Article XXIV rather than using the more flexible 
Enabling Clause. Our findings do suggest that more studies on this issue are warranted.  
We also find that, for Arab League members, market power in some industries mitigates the 
building block effects of forming PTAs. For instance, in industries where countries have low 
degrees of market power, a one percentage point decrease in preferential tariffs leads to a decrease 
of 0.65 percentage points in MFN tariffs. However, in industries where market power is high, 
countries exercise their market power by setting higher MFN tariffs, thereby decreasing the 
building block effect. We also test the robustness of our results using product level data and 
different subsamples as well as testing the effects of market power on multilateral tariffs. All 
results agree with our findings at the industry level. Our findings suggest that preferential trade 
agreements, whether CUs or FTAs if fully implemented under Article XXIV, seem to lead to a 
building block effect. Because of that, whether or not the tariff is close to the bounds does not 




Chapter 2 - Trade Policy Uncertainty: Evidence from the Arab 
League Countries 
I. Introduction: 
Recent events have raised concerns in policy circles about the potential adverse effects of 
uncertainty about trade policy commitments on trade flows and investments. Some events of note 
include the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union (EU) (Crowley et al., 
2019), known as Brexit, the United States leaving the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) (Davis, 
2014) and threatening to leave the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Paletta & Swanson, 2017), 
the trade war between the United States and China (Carballo et al., 2018), the renegotiation of 
NAFTA, and the deteriorating quality of institutions in some countries. As a result, more of the 
literature strives to examine the effects of trade policy uncertainty on trade and investment flows 
following the threat of reversal of existing trade commitments in recent years. As we know, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) strives to promote cooperation and to diminish policy 
uncertainty.43  
A principal policy instrument used to pursue predictability and cooperation in market access 
is to negotiate binding tariffs through which the WTO members make commitments not to increase 
the applied tariffs above the negotiated ceiling tariff rates (also known as bound tariffs). However, 
uncertainty can persist if significant gaps between bound tariffs and applied MFN tariffs are 
pervasive across countries; this discrepancy in tariffs is very common especially in developing 
                                                 





countries where applied MFN tariffs are significantly lower than bound tariffs (Subramanian 
&Wei, 2007, Ludema & Mayda, 2013, and Nicita et al., 2018). Therefore, changing tariffs in the 
presence of water is a major problem in the developing world. However, not a single measure 
using uncertainty index has explored the effect of trade policy uncertainty in developing countries 
relative to developed countries. For example, following Baker et al. (2016), Carballo et al. (2018) 
develop a newspaper-based index of trade policy uncertainty to examine the interaction of 
economic and policy uncertainty for the U.S. 
Recent studies have shown that trade policy uncertainty may negatively affect trade flows. 
Using a trade model with heterogeneous firms for Australia, Handley (2014) shows that trade 
policy uncertainty delays the entry into export markets, making firms less sensitive to reductions 
in applied tariffs. He finds that if Australia reduces all bindings to the current level of applied MFN 
tariffs, the number of traded products would increase by 8.9%. In addition, Handley & Limao 
(2015) show that Portugal increased its exports to the European Union (EU) upon accession even 
in sectors where applied MFN tariffs remained unchanged, which implies that the accession of 
Portugal to the EU has reduced the risk that Portuguese exporters anticipate before the 
membership. Pierce & Schott (2015) show that China’s accession to the WTO has reduced trade 
policy uncertainty, contributing to a large drop in the US manufacturing jobs while Handley & 
Limao (2017) conclude that this reduction in trade policy uncertainty can explain about 22-30% of 
Chinese exports to the US after WTO accession. 
This paper is the first to investigate how trade policy uncertainty may affect firms’ decision to 
export to developing countries. The focus of our analysis is the Arab League markets because this 
is not only an understudied region but where most uncertainty exists. As pointed out by Nicita et 
al. (2018) and Ludema & Mayda (2013), many developing countries tend to have applied MFN 
45 
 
tariffs much lower than their bound tariffs, therefore creating a significant source of policy 
uncertainty since this tariff gap gives them a substantial leeway to change their tariffs without 
violating WTO commitments. In our sample, the overall average bound tariff is about 28 
percentage points, while the average applied MFN tariffs are about 10 percentage points; thus, 
these Arab League countries are characterized by a confluence of quality data and policy variation 
that is relevant to uncertainty. To that end, we define trade policy uncertainty as the gap between 
bound tariffs and applied tariffs, the so-called tariff water or tariff overhang, and we use it to test 
its effects on the probability a product is exported to a member of the Arab League.  
Furthermore, Bloom (2014) suggests that economic downturns affect the degree of policy 
uncertainty, so our empirical strategy also examines the effects of trade policy uncertainty on the 
decision to export by considering added uncertainty related to falling incomes associated with the 
2007-2010 economic shock. Likewise, because all Arab League countries considered in our 
sample are involved in various preferential trade agreements (PTAs), we also test whether 
preferential access affects the exporters’ decision to enter the markets.  
The paper also analyzes the magnitude of the effects of trade policy uncertainty associated with 
importers exercising their market power44 because the possibility of a policy change matters to 
potential exporters if the prices they face change because of changes in the importers’ trade 
policies. As pointed out by Broda et al. (2008), non-WTO countries could increase their external 
tariffs on goods for which they have high degrees of market power. This is relevant to our study 
even though our countries of interest are all WTO members although they do have the gap in their 
tariff schedule. Moreover, Nicita et al. (2018) show that WTO members exercise their market 
                                                 




power when bound tariffs are higher than applied tariffs, as is the case in many developing 
countries, where the bound tariffs tend to be significantly higher than the applied tariff. With a 
sample of Arab league members consisting of new and old WTO members, some of which are 
high-income countries like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates and others are developing like 
Morocco and Tunisia; this is where significant gaps exist. Thus, they can increase their multilateral 
tariffs according to their market power without violating the WTO commitments.  
To carry out our analysis, we construct a comprehensive panel dataset containing information 
on bound tariffs, applied MFN tariffs, preferential tariffs, bilateral trade flows, a measure of the 
degree of market power and import demand elasticities for ten WTO members within the Arab 
league countries45. Our data is organized at the product level (6-digits of the Harmonized System). 
Thus, because the countries in our sample include developing and high-income countries as well 
as new and old WTO members, their bound tariffs vary, and as a result, we have a variation in the 
gap across countries. We defined the difference between bound tariffs and applied tariffs as the 
gap or tariff water that we use as a measure of trade policy uncertainty. We are the first to test the 
effects of trade policy uncertainty on the decision to export to Arab League markets. We also test 
the contribution of other factors on the decision to export to these markets, such as the 2007-2010 
economic shock and the presence of market power that could magnify the effect of trade policy 
uncertainty on the decision to enter. 
Our findings suggest that an increase in trade policy uncertainty reduces the probability a 
product is exported. In particular, we find that a one standard deviation change in water yields a 
change in the probability a product is traded by about 0.025 while a one standard deviation in 
                                                 
45 Note that there are 22 members of the Arab League, but we only include ten because of the data availability and 
membership in the WTO. 
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applied MFN tariffs results in a change in the probability a product is exported by about 0.012. 
We also find that eliminating uncertainty by bringing the bound tariffs to the level of applied MFN 
tariffs leads to an increase in the probability a product is traded by 0.021, which is approximately 
an 18 percent increase based on the overall average probability (0.118) of exported products. 
Eliminating uncertainty through a general move to free trade, where both the bound tariffs and 
applied MFN tariffs are brought down to zero, results in an increase in the probability a product is 
exported by 0.031, which constitutes an approximate increase of 26 percent based on the overall 
average probability (0.118) of a product being exported. Likewise, we also find that controlling 
for the financial crisis of 2007-2010 increased the magnitude of trade policy uncertainty. In 
addition, we find that trade policy uncertainty declines in magnitude in the presence of different 
levels of market power by the importing country. For the robustness of our main findings, we use 
a theoretical definition of uncertainty measure and find that our results remain consistent with our 
baseline results.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes how data is constructed and 
provides summary statistics. Section 3 presents our empirical analysis, and Section 4 discusses 
robustness tests. Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
II. Data Description: 
Our empirical analysis is based on a panel data of more than 5000 products organized at the 6-
digit level of the Harmonized System (HS), which can be exported from any WTO member to any 
of the ten Arab League countries during the period of 1998-2015. To this end, we construct a 
comprehensive dataset at the 6-digit HS level by merging three data sources. First, we start by 
collecting information on applied MFN tariffs, bilateral preferential tariffs, and imports trade 
values from UNCTAD’s Trade Analysis and Information Systems (TRAINS) via the World 
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Integrated Trade System (WITS) database. Second, information on bound tariffs was collected 
from the WTO’s Integrated Database (IDB). Information on applied MFN tariffs and bound tariffs 
allows us to examine the effects of trade policy uncertainty on the decision of exporters to enter 
new markets. Finally, information on ROW’s elasticity of export supply faced by importers allows 
us to determine in which goods a country is deemed to have high or low levels of power. This task 
is accomplished by considering the measures of the inverse of export supply elasticity faced by 
importers, which were estimated by Nicita et al. (2018). This additional measure allows us to test 
the magnitude of trade policy uncertainty when the importing country has the flexibility to change 
its trade policy while controlling for its degree of market power.  
Moreover, because our objective is to estimate the effect of trade policy uncertainty for WTO 
members, we exclude countries that became members after 2006. In addition, we exclude the 
sample of products whose median import value is less than $10,000 (Handley, 2014). Finally, we 
exclude exporters for which median total import trade value is less than $500,000 (Subramanian 
& Wei, 2007); this removes the very small trading countries like Eretria, Croatia, Chad, Myanmar, 
and Somalia. These added changes reduced our data by approximately 73 percent. 
We then construct tariff line measures ((i. e. , 𝑙𝑛(1 +
𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
100
)) for Applied MFN tariffs, 
bound tariffs, and preferential tariffs, tariffs granted to a PTA partners that are usually strictly 
lower than the applied MFN tariffs. We measure trade policy uncertainty in two different ways. 
First, we measure it as the ratio between bound tariffs and Applied MFN tariffs, also known as 
tariff water, which is the key variable in our analysis. Algebraically, we label this variable Water46 
and define it across product k for country pair ij at time t as follows: 
                                                 
46 We set the ratio to equal one if the applied MFN tariff is greater than the bound tariff. We then take the natural log 
of the ratio. 
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𝑾𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒋𝒌𝒕 = 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝐹𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡
)                          (1) 
This uncertainty47 measure reflects the risk that exporting countries take in whether to export or 
delay export to countries with perceived uncertainty. The fact that the gap exists indicates that a 
country can freely increase its applied tariffs up to the bounds, which may have a great impact on 
entry decision of exporters. Thus, the presence of the gap between the bound tariffs and applied 
MFN tariffs makes trade policy less predictable and thus leads to more uncertainty. The second 
measure reflects the theoretical prediction of uncertainty based on a definition provided by 







−σ           (2) 
when using the estimated measure for 𝝈, constant elasticity of substitution, from Nicita et al. 
(2018). The estimates of sigma are given at the 6-digit level, which vary by country and by product. 
We define industry at the 2-digit level code of the harmonized system (HS2) or sector at the 1-
digit level code (HS1). We compute the median elasticity by importer and HS2 and by importer 
and HS1 resulting in the elasticity of substitution for varieties within HS2 or HS1. In our analysis, 
we also take commitments under PTAs into account to measure the effect of preferential trade 
agreements on the probability of exporters entering Arab League markets, and we use this 




                                                 
47 We believe that this uncertainty measure affects firms directly because they know the level of tariffs they have to 
pay. However, there are other uncertainties, such as political uncertainty that some firms may or may not be able to 
fully understand and assess the impact on their exports and sales. 
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Table 2-1. Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean SD Max Min 
Product Traded (binary) 38,879,440 0.118 0.323 1.000 0.000 
Product Traded_10 (binary) 38,879,440 0.107 0.309 1.000 0.000 
Applied MFN (ln) 38,879,440 0.088 0.113 3.434 0.000 
Bound Tariffs (ln) 38,879,440 0.221 0.187 3.434 0.000 
Water (ln) 38,879,440 0.138 0.164 3.434 0.000 
Water07 (ln) 38,879,440 0.090 0.150 3.434 0.000 
Pref_Marg (ln) 34,838,634 -0.009 0.043 0.000 -3.434 
Bind_uncertainty (HS2) 32,935,716 0.099 0.098 1.000 0.000 
Bind_uncertainty (HS1) 34,038,172 0.097 0.090 0.961 0.000 
Source: Data taken from the UNCTAD-TRAINS, WTO-IDB, and Nicita et al. (2018) 
 
The final sample contains 38,879,440 importer-exporter-product and year observations for the 
years 1998 to 2015. Table 1 reports summary statistics of our main variables of interest. Product 
Traded is a binary variable, which is equal to one if a product is exported (or traded) and zero 
otherwise. Thus, our sample contains about 12 percent of traded products. We also construct 
another dependent variable, Product Traded_10, which is also a binary variable for which we 
consider certain products as not traded if the average traded products across all countries and years 
is less than a certain threshold48.  
The key independent variable, Water calculated as in expression (1), implies that the average 
level of the gap between bound tariffs and applied MFN tariffs is approximately 13.8 log 
percentage points. The average Applied MFN tariffs is approximately 8.8 log percentage points 
while the average bound tariff is approximately 22.1 log percentage points, more than twice the 
applied tariffs, which are somewhat in line with Handley (2014). In our sample, applied MFN 
tariffs and bound tariffs vary across products, countries, and years causing a variation in the level 
of tariff water. For instance, we have cases where the tariff water is negative, and in other cases, 
                                                 
48 For this threshold, we compute the lowest 10 percentiles of all traded products across all countries and years and 




we have applied MFN tariffs that are higher than 100%.49 The variation in the tariff schedules of 
the Arab League countries is because North African countries as well as some Middle Eastern 
countries, are old WTO members and thus have high MFN tariffs that they must adjust over time 
in accordance with the WTO requirements. Others are new WTO members facing more demanding 
constraints after joining WTO. The level of uncertainty measure using the theoretical definition of 
uncertainty as shown by the variable Bind_uncertainty, calculated in expression (2), is 
approximately 10 percentage points when using the elasticity of substitution between varieties 
within HS2 and 9.7 when using the elasticity of substitution between varieties within HS1. 
Furthermore, most country-pairs considered in our analysis are involved in preferential trade 
agreements. Thus, we use the variable Pref_Marg50 to test the effect of the presence of preferential 
trade agreements on the decision to export a product to a member of the Arab League.  
III. Empirical Analysis: 
We assess the effects of trade policy uncertainty on entry decisions of exporters to Arab League 
markets by estimating the following model: 
𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ln(𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡) + 𝛽2 ln(𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝐹𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡) + 𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡      (3) 
Where 𝒑𝒊𝒋𝒌𝒕 denotes the probability of whether product k is exported from country j to a member 
of the Arab League i at time t. 𝑾𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒋𝒌𝒕 as described in the data description is our main variable 
of interest, capturing the level of trade policy uncertainty faced by country j when exporting 
product k to country i at time t. 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑴𝑭𝑵𝒊𝒌𝒕 is a tariff that country i imposes on country j on 
product k at time t. To control for other factors, such as exchange rates, aggregate wages, and price 
                                                 
49 Egypt has applied MFN tariffs that are higher than 100% for Spirits. 




index that could affect a country’s decision to enter new markets, we use a comprehensive set of 
importer-exporter-year fixed effects denoted by 𝜹𝒊𝒋𝒕. We also control for other time-invariant, 
unobserved heterogeneity such as fixed costs, including sunk costs that non-exporters must incur 
to enter foreign markets; Roberts & Tybout (1997) note, “the combination of sunk cost and 
uncertainty about future market conditions can create an option value to waiting”; costs to upgrade, 
expand, or build new facilities to satisfy importer demands; costs associated with hiring and firing 
of employees (Bloom, 2009; Schaal, 2013); and costs to adopt technology (Bessen, 2002). The 
presence of such costs could contribute to the entry decision of the exporting country, and as a 
result, we use importer-exporter-product fixed effects denoted by 𝜸𝒊𝒋𝒌. The term 𝝐𝒊𝒋𝒌𝒕 represents 
the error term.  
We use specification (3) to investigate the effects of trade policy uncertainty on the entry 
decision of exporters to Arab League markets. Because we include a large set of fixed effects in 
our regression, to avoid any computational problems and inconsistencies in our estimates, we 
estimate specification (3) using a linear probability model51. In all the regressions, robust standard 
errors are clustered at the importer-product-year level. The coefficients of interest in specification 
(3) are 𝛽1 and 𝛽2. A negative and statistically significant 𝛽1 would imply that trade policy 
uncertainty induces firms to wait, postponing entry into Arab League markets. A negative and 
statistically significant 𝛽2 suggests that higher applied MFN tariffs in county i are negatively 
related to the probability of exporting from country j to country i; in other words, higher current 
costs (applied MFN tariffs) induce firms not to enter.  
                                                 
51 The high dimensional set of fixed effects that we include in our model means that a standard Probit model would 




a. Baseline Results:  
We first analyze the effect of trade policy uncertainty on trade using the overall sample; we 
then test to see if the effect of uncertainty on entry varies across the ten Arab League countries by 
estimating our model using a measure of uncertainty defined in expression (1) at the country level 
data trying to identify factors that could lead to that variation. Table 2 reports results of the linear 
probability model estimated using equation (3). Our dependent variable is again the binary variable 
that corresponds to zero if a product is not traded and one if it is traded. The estimated model then 
yields the probability whether product k is exported by country j to a member of the Arab League 
country i at year t. The key explanatory variables are 𝑾𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒋𝒌𝒕, and 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑴𝑭𝑵𝒊𝒋𝒌𝒕, and both 












              Table 2-2. Probability a Product is Traded  
Dependent variables   Product Traded   Product Traded_10 
    (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Water (ln)   0.029*** -0.061*** -0.151***   0.017*** -0.054*** -0.136*** 
    (0.001) (0.002) (0.012)   (0.001) (0.002) (0.011) 
Applied MFN (ln)   -0.042*** 0.008*** -0.103***   -0.043*** 0.001 -0.095*** 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.011)   (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) 
Constant   0.118*** 0.126*** 0.148***   0.108*** 0.114*** 0.134*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
                  
F-test  
  676.53 561.44 112.72   593.21 505.31 115.37 
  [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00]   [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]  
Fixed Effects:                 
   Importer-Exporter-Year   NO YES YES   NO YES YES 
   Importer-Exporter-Product   NO NO YES   NO NO YES 
Observations   38,879,440 38,879,440 38,879,440   38,879,440 38,879,440 38,879,440 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the importer-product-year level. P-values are reported in brackets.  
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. 
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Columns 1 to 3 report the results from estimating equation (3) using the full sample, and 
columns 4 to 6 report the results from estimating equation (3) with the dependent variable 
computed slightly differently, by considering products traded in small amounts as not traded. 
Feenstra (1994), Hummels & Klenow (2005), and Borda & Weinsten (2006) treat a good as 
nontraded if the trade flow is zero, while Evenett & Venables (2002) report a good as nontraded if 
it is less than $50,000 of trade. Additionally, Kehoe & Ruhl (2013) consider goods with zero trade 
as well as goods with very small amounts of trade as nontraded goods.  The standard errors in all 
the regressions are clustered at the importer-product-year level. Columns 1 and 4 provide OLS 
estimates with no fixed effects. The coefficient on 𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝑾𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓 is statistically significant at the one 
percent level of significance. However, the positive sign suggests that as the trade policy 
uncertainty reflected on the gap between bound tariffs and applied MFN, or as the uncertainty level 
increases, the probability that a product is exported (or traded) increases, which is not 
economically reasonable. However, the coefficient on the 𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑴𝑭𝑵 is negative and 
statistically significant, suggesting that higher applied MFN tariffs in country i are negatively 
related to the probability that a product is exported from country j to country i as we would expect. 
Furthermore, in columns 2 and 5, we include one set of fixed effects, importer-exporter-year 
fixed effects to handle all importer, exporter, and year specific factors like wages, exchange rates, 
and price levels. Doing so changed the results. While the effects of the uncertainty measure, 
𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝑾𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓, remains statistically significant at the one percent level of significance, the sign on 
its coefficient in both columns 2 and 5 is now negative as expected. Also, the coefficient on 
𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑴𝑭𝑵𝒊𝒋𝒌𝒕 remains statistically significant in column 2 but positive, while 
insignificant and positive in column 5. Thus, using this set of fixed effects allows us to eliminate 
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a key source of omitted variable bias, namely importer, exporter, and year specific factors as 
mentioned above.  
Consequently, our preferred estimates are shown in columns 3 and 6 where we include two 
large sets of fixed effects, the importer-exporter-year fixed effects and the importer-exporter-
product fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, such as sunk costs, 
that could affect the entry decision of the exporting countries. As expected, we find negative and 
statistically significant effects for both 𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝑾𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓 and 𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑴𝑭𝑵52. The results show 
that an increase in trade policy uncertainty as captured by the 𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝑾𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓 variable reduces the 
probability to export. The coefficient on 𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑴𝑭𝑵 shows that higher applied MFN 
tariffs in country i are negatively related to the probability that a product is exported from country 
j to country i. The estimates in both columns 3 and 6 have some significant economic effects. For 
example, in Column 3, a one standard deviation change in water yields a change in the probability 
a product is traded by about 0.025.53 In addition, a one standard deviation change in applied MFN 
tariffs results in a change in the probability a product is traded by about 0.012.54 These findings 
are meaningful for Australia relative to Handley (2014) where a one standard deviation change in 
water yields a change in the probability a product is traded by 0.004 while a one standard deviation 
change in applied MFN tariffs yields a change in the probability a product is traded by 0.008. Our 
results then indicate that the adverse effect of uncertainty on the number of products traded is 
higher for developing countries, where most of the uncertainty resides, than developed countries.  
                                                 
52 Considering products traded in small amounts does not alter the results we obtain using full sample. 
53 Computed by multiplying the coefficient of 𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝑾𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓 by its standard deviation (see summary statistics). 
Algebraically: 0.151 × 0.164 = 0.025. 
54 Computed by multiplying the coefficient of 𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑴𝑭𝑵 by its standard deviation (see summary statistics). 
Algebraically: 0.103 × 0.113 = 0.012. 
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From a policy perspective, it may be more interesting to consider a situation where WTO 
negotiations eliminate this particular source of uncertainty by reducing the bound tariffs to the 
level of applied MFN tariffs. Our results in Column 3 suggest that eliminating uncertainty by 
bringing bound tariffs to the current level of applied MFN yields an increase in the probability a 
product is traded by about 0.02155. This constitutes about an 1856 percent increase based on the 
overall average probability (0.118) of a product being traded57, which is in an order of magnitude 
greater than the estimates of Handley & Limao (2017) for China. Our findings from our preferred 
estimates are all in line with the theoretical predictions that trade policy uncertainty hinders trade 
because it induces some firms to delay entry into new markets. Thus, the exporting countries are 
more likely to export when the applied MFN tariffs of the importing country are lower and when 
the tariff water is also lower so that any potential increase in tariffs would limit their losses. 
Alternatively, we consider a situation of a general move to free trade where both the bound tariffs 
and applied MFN tariffs are brought down to zero.  Our results in Column 3 suggest that fully 
liberalizing trade yields an increase in the probability a product is traded by about 0.03158, which 
is significant considering that it is about 2659 percent increase based on the overall average 
probability (0.118) of a product being exported. 
                                                 
55 Computed by multiplying the coefficient of 𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝑾𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓 by its mean value (see summary statistics). Algebraically: 
0.151 × 0.138 = 0.021. 
56 Computed by multiplying the coefficient of 𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝑾𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓 by its mean value divided by the overall average probability 
(0.118) of a product being traded (see summary statistics). Algebraically: 
0.151×0.138
0.118
× 100% ≈ 18%. 
57 Handley’s findings for Australia, where uncertainty was eliminated by bringing the bound tariffs to the current level 
of applied MFN lead to 8.8 percent increase in exported products (Handley, 2014). 
58 Computed by multiplying the coefficient of 𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝑾𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓 by its mean value plus the coefficient of log Applied MFN 
multiplied by its mean value (see summary statistics). Algebraically:  
(0.151 × 0.138) + (0.103 × 0.088) = 0.031.  
59 Computed by multiplying the coefficient of 𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝑾𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓 by its mean value plus the coefficient of log Applied MFN 





× 100% ≈ 26%. 
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To test our results to see if they are consistent across the ten Arab League countries, we run 
our analysis using specification (3) by members of the Arab League. Thus, our fixed effects capture 
exporter-year and exporter-product fixed effects. The OLS results from estimating equation (3) 
using subsamples, based on geographical locations of the member countries as well as their 
accession to the WTO, are shown in Table 3. Uncertainty is related to the gap between the bound 
tariffs and applied MFN tariffs. The gap exists primarily in North Africa and some Middle Eastern 
countries; because these countries are old WTO members, they can set very high bound tariffs 
based on the Enabling Clause that allows developing countries to adopt any trade policy for their 
development. However, other members of the League, in particular, GCC countries, are new WTO 
members that faced a far more demanding process to join the WTO (Subramanian & Wei, 2007)60. 
Given the variation in the trade policies of the member countries, we can test the extent of the 
effect of trade policy uncertainty of on the exporters decision to enter individual markets.  
The results in Table 3 are similar to those in Table 2. Our preferred results are shown in 
columns 3, 6, 9, and 12. The results imply that the higher the tariff water and applied MFN tariffs 
the lower the probability to export to the Arab League countries, not only to the major economies 
shown in Table 3 but also to other countries as shown in Table 3A in the appendix. The coefficients 
on 𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝑾𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓 and 𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑴𝑭𝑵 are negative and statistically significant in all countries 
except Kuwait.   
Furthermore, our analysis of the economic effects of trade policy uncertainty, as shown in 
Table 3, were no surprise. Our findings suggest that the representatives of North African countries 
                                                 
60 For example, Kuwait, Egypt, and Morocco joined the GATT in 1963, 1970, and 1987, respectively, and their 
corresponding average tariff water, or gap, is 62.7, 12.1, and 18.5 log percentage points. The GCC countries such as 
Qatar, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, who joined the WTO in 1994, 2000, and 2005, respectively, have average tariff water 
equal to 9.4, 6.9, and 4.3 log percentage points.  
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in Table 3, namely Morocco and Egypt, are among the most affected by trade policy uncertainty. 
For example, in the case of Morocco, the results in Column 6 of Table 3 indicate that eliminating 
uncertainty by reducing the bound tariffs to the level of applied MFN tariffs increases the 
probability a product is exported by about 0.05661  which is very high considering that the average 
value of the dependent variable (Product Traded) for Morocco is 0.096, which constitutes nearly 
a 5862 percent increase over the unconditional probability a product is exported. The significant 
effect was because, as we mentioned before, North African countries, as well as some Middle 
Eastern countries, have high levels of tariff water resulting in high levels of trade policy 
uncertainty. However, for some Arab League countries, the tariff water is not as high as for North 
African countries because of the restrictive conditions they faced in joining the WTO and also 
possibly because their trade policy commitments are different. The magnitudes of the coefficients 
of 𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝑾𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓 and 𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑴𝑭𝑵 tariffs in both Table 3 and Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix B 
vary compared to Table 2. Nonetheless, the elimination of trade policy uncertainty even for those 
countries would be significant, potentially leading to an increase in the probability of exporting a 
product to these markets. 
                                                 
61 Computed by multiplying the coefficient of Water by its mean value. Algebraically: 𝟎. 𝟑𝟎𝟑 × 0.185 = 0.056. 
62 Computed by multiplying the coefficient of Water for Tunisia by its mean value divided by the overall average 
probability (0.105) of a product being traded. Algebraically: 
𝟎.𝟑𝟎𝟑×0.185
0.096
× 100% ≈ 58%. 
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Table 2-3. Probability a Product is Traded – Sample of Major Economies in North Africa and the Middle East 
Product Traded 
North Africa   GCC 
                       Egypt                     .                                                               Morocco                   .                                    Qatar                   .                                        Kuwait                      .                      
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 10  (11) (12) 
Water (ln) 0.088*** 0.086*** -0.033* -0.122*** -0.117*** -0.303***   0.103*** 0.092*** -0.308*** -0.169*** -0.165*** -0.079 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.018) (0.004) (0.004) (0.023)   (0.017) (0.017) (0.076) (0.012) (0.011) (0.094) 
Applied MFN (ln) 0.017*** 0.019*** -0.024* -0.090*** -0.080*** -0.235***   -0.070*** -0.064*** -0.088* 0.139** 0.122** 0.036 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.014) (0.003) (0.003) (0.022)   (0.017) (0.016) (0.052) (0.060) (0.058) (0.099) 
Constant 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.107*** 0.134*** 0.131*** 0.191***   0.159*** 0.159*** 0.198*** 0.269*** 0.268*** 0.217*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008)   (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.063) 
                            
F-test  157.75 157.9 1.98 511.4 483.67 205.18   22.79 18.14 20.82 100.98 108.92 5.20 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.13] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]   [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] 
Fixed Effects:                           
 Exporter-Year NO YES YES NO YES YES   NO YES YES NO YES YES 
 Exporter-Product NO NO YES NO NO YES   NO NO YES NO NO YES 
                            
Observations 7,262,845 7,262,845 7,262,845 4,544,785 4,544,785 4,544,785   2,548,880 2,548,880 2,548,880 2,292,388 2,292,388 2,292,388 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the product-year level. P-values are reported in brackets.  




b. Trade Policy Uncertainty During the Economic Crisis of 2007-2010: 
During 2007-2010, the world economy experienced one of its most severe economic and 
financial crises, resulting in a 12.2 percent63 decline in world trade in 2009, the largest since WWII. 
Subsequently, falling incomes as a result of the economic shock led to a widespread fear of 
protectionism in the trade system (Limao & Maggi, 2015). Falling incomes may amplify policy 
uncertainty due to the presence of tariff water. Our next step is then to analyze the potential effect 
of the great recession of 2007-2010 on the decision to enter Arab League markets. In Table 4, we 
interact the variable measuring trade policy uncertainty, Water, with a binary variable (after07) to 
indicate the potential additional effect of trade policy uncertainty during the financial crisis of 2007 
and beyond. In some specifications, we also add the preference margin control, Pref_Marg, to test 
the effect of preferential trade agreements on the decision to enter Arab League markets. This 
additional control is included because all Arab League countries in our analysis have preferential 
trade agreements. 
In columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 of Table 4, we use the Water variable as defined by expression (1). 
Moreover, because the way in which the Water variable is defined is relevant to exporters, we run 
the equivalents of columns 2 and 5 as shown in columns 3 and 6 using an alternative definition of 
the Water64 variable. Instead of measuring trade policy uncertainty as the degree of flexibility 
provided by the multilateral trade agreements, we use actual bilateral tariffs that control for the 
possible presence of preferential trade agreements. Preferential tariffs are usually lower than 
applied MFN tariffs, so the alternative method of computing the Water variable will result in larger 
                                                 
63 World Trade Organization. World trade report 2010: Trade in natural resources. In: Geneva: World trade 
organization, 2010, pp. 252.; 2010:252.  







gap, or more uncertainty. Column 1 reports the results of the linear probability model estimated in 
equation (3) with the added interaction term, Water07. The estimated uncertainty measure before 
the financial crisis is indicated by the coefficient on log Water, which is negative and statistically 
significant as expected. This indicates that a one standard deviation change in water tariff leads to 
a change in the probability a product is traded by about 0.021. However, to determine the effect of 
uncertainty after the financial crisis we sum up the coefficient for the variable measuring trade 
policy uncertainty (log Water) and the coefficient of its interaction with the binary variable for the 
period during and after the crisis (log Water07). We find that a one standard deviation change in 
water during the crisis results in a change of 0.025 of the probability a product is traded. The results 
are negative and statistically significant indicating that controlling for the financial crisis 
dramatically increases the magnitude of trade policy uncertainty. Also, the coefficient on log 
Applied MFN is negative and statistically significant as in our baseline results. 
Referring to Column 1, the results suggest that eliminating uncertainty before the financial 
crisis, by reducing the bound tariffs to the level of applied MFN tariffs, results in an increase in 
the probability a product is traded by about 0.018, which is about a 15 percent increase over the 
unconditional probability of exporting. However, the effect of eliminating uncertainty after the 
crisis is significant because it results in an increase in the probability of a product being traded by 
about 0.021, which is more than an 18 percent increase in the probability a product is exported (or 
traded). Because of the additional risk the crisis entails, the responsiveness of entry to uncertainty 
elimination is substantial when bringing the bound tariffs to the applied tariffs levels. Similar 
results are found in Column 4 when the least traded products are treated as untraded. 
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Table 2-4. The Effects of the Economic Crisis of 2007 and the Presence of PTAs on the Probability a Product is Traded  
 Dependent Variables Product Traded   Product Traded_10 
 Main Definition   Alternative Definition   Main Definition   Alternative Definition 
  (1) (2)   (3)   (4) (5)   (6) 
                    
Water (ln) -0.127*** -0.132***   -0.177***   -0.115*** -0.122***   -0.163*** 
  (0.013) (0.014)   (0.011)   (0.011) (0.012)   (0.010) 
Water07 (ln) -0.027*** -0.032***   -0.027***   -0.023*** -0.027***   -0.021*** 
  (0.002) (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.002) (0.002)   (0.002) 
Applied MFN (ln) -0.093*** -0.075***   -0.093***   -0.086*** -0.072***   -0.089*** 
  (0.011) (0.011)   (0.008)   (0.009) (0.010)   (0.007) 
Pref_Marg (ln)   0.225***   0.066***     0.190***   0.047*** 
    (0.006)   (0.009)     (0.005)   (0.008) 
Constant 0.146*** 0.151***   0.159***   0.132*** 0.137***   0.144*** 
  (0.003) (0.003)   (0.002)   (0.002) (0.002)   (0.002) 
                    
F-test 
171.32 469.16   475.55   161.51 424.13   431.91 
[0.00] [0.00]   [0.00]   [0.00] [0.00]   [0.00] 
                    
PTAs NO65 YES66   YES   NO YES   YES 
                    
Observations 38,879,440 34,838,634   34,838,634   38,879,440 34,838,634   34,838,634 
Note: All regressions include importer-exporter-year and importer-exporter-product fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses adjusted  
for clustering at the importer-product-year level. P-values are reported in brackets.  
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
                                                 
65 Not controlling for preference margin. 
66 Controlling for preference margin. 
64 
 
As mentioned before, all Arab League countries considered in our analysis are involved in a 
variety of preferential trade agreements. Therefore, we run our model by including a variable that 
controls for the presence of PTAs, Pref_Marg, to test whether the presence of preferential trade 
agreements reduces the cost of doing trade because as explained in the earlier sections, preferential 
trade agreements are designed to just do that. The results are presented in columns 2 and 5 of Table 
4. Controlling for preference margin uncertainty continues to play a role that we expect. The 
coefficients of log Water and of its interaction with the binary variable for the period during and 
after the crisis as well as the coefficient on the log Applied MFN continue to be negative and 
statistically significant. The coefficient on log Pref_Marg is positive and statistically significant 
indicating that the presence of preferential trade agreements reduces the cost of doing trade. The 
greater the margin, the greater the entry. However, controlling for the presence of preferential 
agreements has not changed the effect of uncertainty (Water) over entry decision, which continues 
to be negative.  
The economic effects of eliminating trade policy uncertainty when we control for the economic 
shock as well as the presence of PTAs are significant. Using the results shown in Column 2, 
eliminating trade policy uncertainty by reducing the bound tariffs to the level of applied MFN 
tariffs during the period before the crisis results in an increase in the probability a product is traded 
by around 0.018 or (1.8 percent), which constitutes an approximately 15 percent increase based on 
the average probability (0.118) of a product being traded. Alternatively, eliminating trade policy 
uncertainty during the period of crisis, as presented by the summation of the coefficient of log 
Water and its interaction, is very significant because it leads to an increase in the probability a 
product is traded by about 0.023 percent, which is an approximately 20 percent increase over the 
unconditional probability of exporting. The coefficient on log Pref_Marg is positive and 
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statistically significant indicting that a one standard deviation change in preference margin leads a 
change in the probability a product is traded by about 0.01 (or 1 percent). Thus, by controlling for 
the preference margin, uncertainty continues to be negative as we would expect, but the preference 
margin does promote trade by decreasing the cost of doing trade. Columns 3 and 6 present the 
results when the alternative definition of tariff water is used as in expression (2). The results are 
all in line with those obtained using the main definition of uncertainty, water, suggesting that no 
matter how we measure the uncertainty variable, the results are similar.  
The effect of trade policy uncertainty should be related to the degree to which the importing 
country can affect external prices. Thus, our expectation is that uncertainty will be higher if the 
importing country exhibits high market power.  Thus, in Table 5, we test the effects of uncertainty 
on the decision of exporters to enter new markets while controlling for the presence of different 
levels of market power. To do this, we create a dummy variable (PWR) to indicate observations 
for which the importer has high or low market power. More specifically, PWR is equal to one if 
the inverse of the export supply elasticity faced by the importer at the product level is higher than 
the median or the 67th percentile of the distribution of the inverse elasticity (market power) by the 
importing country and zero otherwise. In creating the PWR dummy variable, we had to limit our 
sample size to include only observations for which the elasticities were available. Columns 1 
through 4 present results when the dependent variable includes all products traded, while columns 
5 through 8 treat the least traded products as untraded. The coefficients of log Water and log 
Applied MFN are always negative and statistically significant in all columns, differing only in 
magnitude.  For example, comparing the results in columns 1 and 2, a one standard deviation 
change in water results in a change in the probability a product is exported by about 0.052 when 
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the exporter is faced with an importer with high market power and 0.037 with an importer with 
low market power. The Wald test shows the two are statistically different. 
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  Table 2-5. Probability a Product is Traded under Different Levels of Market Power  

























  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                    
Water (ln) -0.315*** -0.228*** -0.288*** -0.256***   -0.295*** -0.198*** -0.263*** -0.230*** 
  (0.019) (0.028) (0.024) (0.026)   (0.017) (0.025) (0.021) (0.024) 
Applied MFN (ln) -0.244*** -0.165*** -0.220*** -0.189***   -0.232*** -0.146*** -0.204*** -0.173*** 
  (0.017) (0.028) (0.021) (0.026)   (0.015) (0.025) (0.018) (0.024) 
Constant 0.183*** 0.164*** 0.178*** 0.170***   0.168*** 0.147*** 0.161*** 0.154*** 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)   (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
                    
F-test 148.92 90.7 93.84 131.56   163.73 83.83 96.36 126.33 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]   [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
                    
Observations 9,364,409 9,366,417 6,177,105 12,553,721   9,364,409 9,366,417 6,177,105 12,553,721 
Note: All regressions include importer-exporter-year and importer-exporter-product fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses adjusted  
for clustering at the importer-product-year level. P-values are reported in brackets.  
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
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Furthermore, referring to Column 1, when an exporter is faced with an importer that exhibits 
high market power, a one standard deviation change in applied MFN tariffs results in a change in 
the probability a product is traded by about 0.02867, while 0.01968 if the exporting country is faced 
with an importer that exhibits low market power as shown in Column 2; this comparison implies 
that the presence of high market power magnifies the effects of trade policy uncertainty. Based on 
the results in column 1, eliminating trade policy uncertainty in markets where the exporter is facing 
an importer with high market power results in an increase in the probability a product is exported 
by about 0.043469 which is very significant, an approximately 28 percent increase based on the 
high-powered products average of the unconditional probability of 0.15 a product is exported. 
Notwithstanding, eliminating trade policy uncertainty even in markets with low market power, as 
shown in Column 2, results in an increase in the probability a product is traded by about 0.031, 
which is approximately 22 percent based on the low-powered products average of the 
unconditional probability of 0.143 a product is exported. Eliminating trade policy uncertainty 
when the importing countries exhibit high or low market power results in a significant increase in 
the probability a product is traded compared to the results from Table 2. The reason for this 
difference is that the measure of market power was not available for all products, as can be seen 
from the difference in sample sizes. Similar results were obtained when considering the 67th 
percentile in determining products with high and low market power as shown in columns 3 and 4. 
                                                 
67 Computed by multiplying the coefficient of 𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑴𝑭𝑵  by its standard deviation (see summary statistics). 
Algebraically: 0.244 × 0.113 = 0.028. 
68 Computed by multiplying the coefficient of 𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑴𝑭𝑵  by its standard deviation (see summary statistics). 
Algebraically: 0.165 × 0.113 = 0.019. 
69 Computed by multiplying the coefficient of 𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝑾𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓 by its mean value (see summary statistics). Algebraically: 
0.315 × 0.138 = 0.0434. 
69 Computed by multiplying the coefficient of 𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝑾𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓 by its mean value divided by the overall average probability 
(0.118) of a product being traded (see summary statistics). Algebraically: 
0.315×0.138=0.0434
0.15




Moreover, treating the least traded goods as untraded, as shown in columns 5 through 8, results in 
similar effects as when we consider least traded goods as traded. 
IV. Robustness: 
Table 6 shows the robustness tests for our main findings using the theoretical definition of the 
uncertainty measure in expression (2). For the following analysis, our key explanatory variables 
will be the 𝑩𝒊𝒏𝒅_𝒖𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒚 and Applied MFN tariffs. We run a series of robustness tests 
using the estimated measure of sigma70 from Nicita et al. (2018). Because the theoretical measure 
of uncertainty depends on the industry level (HS2) elasticity of substitution and sector level (HS1), 
we estimate our model as shown in Table 6 with varying estimates of sigma. Two important 
features stand out. First, the results are the same regardless of what definition of uncertainty we 
use. Second, the preference margin effect is much larger than the results from Table 4.  
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 the signs and significance of the coefficient of the uncertainty 
measure, 𝑩𝒊𝒏𝒅_𝒖𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒚, are unchanged compared to the results in Table 2. The results 
continue to imply a negative effect on entry. However, aggregating sigma from industry level to 
sector level, as in columns 1 and 2, tends to increase the magnitude of the estimated coefficients 
of the uncertainty measure. In columns 3 and 4, we control for the presence of preferential tariffs, 
and the results continue to hold like those obtained in Table 4. However, using the theoretical 
measure of uncertainty at different aggregation levels of sigma increased the effect of preferential 
tariffs on the cost of doing trade, but uncertainty continues to play its role as expected. Columns 5 
to 8 report results when we consider the least traded goods as untraded. Nevertheless, our results 
remain consistent with our baseline results as obtained in Tables 3 and 4. 
                                                 
70 𝜎: price elasticity of imports demand 
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To investigate the sensitivity of the two measures of uncertainty as defined in expressions (1) 
and (2) from a policy point of view, we compare their economic effects when the source of 
uncertainty is removed. Our results in Column 1 suggest that eliminating trade policy uncertainty 
by bringing the bound tariffs to the current level of applied MFN increases the probability a product 
is traded by about 0.0171. This constitutes about a 672 percent increase based on the overall average 
probability (0.118) of a product being traded, which is in the same order of magnitude as in 
Handley (2014) for Australia. However, these findings are much lower than in Table 2, where we 
find that eliminating trade policy uncertainty leads to an approximately 18 percent increase in the 
probability a product is traded. Column 2 suggests that eliminating trade policy uncertainty would 
result in an increase in the probability a product is traded by 0.016, which is an approximately 14 
percent increase based on the overall average probability (0.118) of a product being traded; these 
findings are comparable in the order of magnitude to the same estimates in Handley & Limao 
(2017) for the US and to our findings from Table 2. Thus, from an economic point of view, the 
way in which sigma is aggregated matters in determining the effect of trade policy uncertainty. 
                                                 
71 Computed by multiplying the coefficient of Bind_uncertainty by its mean value. Algebraically: 
 0.0712 × 0.099 = 0.01. 
72 Computed by multiplying the coefficient of Bind_uncertainty by its mean value divided by the overall average 
probability (0.118) of a product being exported. Algebraically: 
0.0712×0.099
0.118





Table 2-6. Probability a Product is Traded using the Theoretical Definition of Uncertainty 
Dependent Variable Product Traded   Product Traded_10 
 HS2 level HS1 level   HS2 level HS1 level   HS2 level HS1 level   HS2 level HS1 level 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
Bind_uncertainty -0.071*** -0.116***   -0.115*** -0.172***   -0.065*** -0.107***   -0.106*** -0.159*** 
  (0.008) (0.012)   (0.010) (0.013)   (0.007) (0.011)   (0.008) (0.011) 
Applied MFN (ln) -0.026*** -0.052***   0.009 -0.022***   -0.026*** -0.050***   0.004 -0.025*** 
  (0.006) (0.008)   (0.007) (0.008)   (0.005) (0.007)   (0.006) (0.007) 
Pref_Marg (ln)       0.390*** 0.397***         0.345*** 0.353*** 
        (0.007) (0.007)         (0.006) (0.006) 
                        
F-test 104.26 114.44   1278.75 1372.39   93.09 108.7   1232.27 1318.22 
  [0.00] [0.00]   [0.00] [0.00]   [0.00] [0.00]   [0.00] [0.00] 
                        
PTAs NO NO   YES YES   NO NO   YES YES 
                        
Observations 32,927,893 34,029,791   29,029,994 30,101,383   32,927,893 34,029,791   29,029,994 30,101,383 
Note: All regressions include Importer-Exporter-Year and Importer-Exporter-Product fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses adjusted for clustering  
at the importer-product-year level. P-values are reported in brackets.  




V. Conclusion:  
This paper contributes to the emerging economic literature that studies the effect of trade policy 
uncertainty on the decision to export by providing empirical evidence of how uncertainty affects 
the decision to export to Arab League countries. Using product level data, we find that trade policy 
uncertainty reduces exporter entry to Arab League markets. Economically, our results suggest that 
eliminating uncertainty by reducing the bound tariffs to the level of applied MFN increases the 
probability a product is exported by about 18 percent while fully liberalizing trade by bringing 
both tariffs to zero increases the probability a product is exported by about 26 percent based on 
the overall average probability (0.118) of a product being exported.  
We also find that the 2007-2010 financial crisis has contributed to more policy uncertainty, 
further affecting the entry decision of exporters into Arab League markets. Our analyses also 
suggest that when the importing country exhibits high levels of market power, the effects of 
uncertainty on exporters entry into Arab League markets are magnified.  Our findings imply that 
the effects of trade policy uncertainty on the number of products traded is higher in developing 







Chapter 3 - The Price Effects of the Trade Agreements Formed by Arab 
League Countries 
I. Introduction: 
Over the past two decades, the Arab League countries have been involved in a variety of 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs), including free trade areas (FTAs) and a customs union (CU), 
with the intent to strengthen their economic ties and liberalize their trade regimes among other 
objectives. The proliferation of trade agreements, not only among the Arab League countries but 
throughout the entire world, has raised concerns among trade policy analysts that PTAs may 
undermine the multilateral regime. According to the international trade literature, preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) lower trade barriers on imported goods from preferential partners, leading to 
consumer gains from better quality products, lower prices for existing products, and deteriorating 
terms of trade for the importing country relative to preferential partners (Berlingieri et. al, 2018). 
Economic theory emphasizes the terms of trade effects, while simulation models illustrate the 
theory with statistical measures of terms of trade due to tariff changes (Anderson & Yotov, 2011). 
However, little empirical evidence shows the effect of trade agreements on the terms of trade, and 
much of the literature has focused on how the terms of trade may change for non-PTA members. 
For example, Chang & Winters (2002) examine the effect of Mercosur, specifically with Brazil 
eliminating tariffs for Mercosur members, on the export prices of countries excluded from the 
agreement. They find that creating Mercosur was associated with significant declines in prices of 
nonmember exports to the region. Brazil grants preferential access to its Mercosur partners from 
tariffs, resulting in a competitive pressure that led other exporters to reduce their prices. This 
means, according to theory, that trade diversion is worsening the terms of trade of excluded 
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countries. However, there is a little evidence on the effects of trade agreements on the importing 
countries’ terms of trade. 
This paper focuses on Arab League countries because this is an understudied region with 
considerable variation in types of agreements, including CUs and FTAs. Silva & Benaddi (2018) 
study the Arab League countries, where they examine the effects of preferential tariffs on applied 
Most-Favored Nations (MFN) tariffs, and they find a building block effect. In other words, they 
find that the lower the preferential tariffs, the lower the applied MFN tariffs. However, this does 
not guarantee that nonmembers will benefit from this decrease in tariffs. Not only that, when 
countries grant each other preferential access, their terms of trade tend to deteriorate as they import 
from their partners but improve as they export to them. Thus, this paper is, to the best of our 
knowledge, the first that examines the effects of trade preferences granted by members of the Arab 
League on their international import prices, an essential component of the terms of trade. Because 
countries are affected through price changes, this is a fundamental question to tackle.  
Furthermore, Silva & Benaddi (2018) find that members of the Arab League countries have, 
on average, significant market power. They also find that market power matters in determining the 
building block effect. More specifically, they find that when the importing country shows high 
levels of market power the building block effect of preferential tariffs tends to be mitigated.   
Moreover, they find that the degree of market power of the member countries varies from region 
to region and across products. Since most members of the League are developing countries and 
old WTO members, they are mostly not constrained by WTO bound tariffs, and theory predicts 
that their applied MFN tariffs would be positively related to market power (Broda et al., 2008). 




To answer our questions, we construct a comprehensive dataset containing information on 
applied MFN tariffs, preferential tariffs, and import values. In addition, we obtain information on 
the international import price index and quality-adjusted import price index from Feenstra & 
Romalis (2014) at 6-digit level code (HS). Finally, a measure of the inverse of the export supply 
elasticity faced by importers, estimated by Nicita et al. (2018), is then added to our dataset, also 
organized at the 6-digit level (Harmonized System; HS). This additional measure allows us to 
examine the effect of importer market power on international prices. 
Using a panel data strategy, we investigate the effects of applied MFN tariffs and preferential 
tariffs imposed by members of the Arab League on international prices. We control for the usual 
macroeconomic factors (exchange rate changes, economic growth, among others) by using 
country-year fixed effects, while we control for political economy factors by using country-
industry fixed effects. Our basic specification investigates how preferential tariffs and MFN tariffs 
applied by Arab League members affect import prices. Moreover, we extend our specification by 
controlling for any possible differences in the effects of CUs and FTAs as well as the presence of 
market power. 
Our baseline results suggest that a one percentage point decrease in applied MFN tariffs leads 
to a fall in international import prices of approximately 0.16 percentage points, while domestic 
prices of imported goods, as well as those goods produced domestically if they are homogeneous 
or perfect substitutes to imported goods, fall by 0.84 percentage points. We also find that a one 
percentage point decrease in preferential tariffs leads to 0.084 percentage point increase in 
international prices while domestic prices of imported goods decreased by 0.92 percentage points. 
Moreover, we find no significant effects of MFN tariffs and preferential tariffs on the terms of 
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trade under a CU. Also, we test the effect of the two tariffs on import price index using a Wald test 
and find that their effect is not statistically different, implying that the two are equally important. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data that we use 
and summary statistics; Section 3 describes the empirical strategy; Section 4 concludes. 
II. Data Description: 
a. Data Sources: 
We estimate our empirical model using a comprehensive dataset that includes information on 
more than 5000 products organized at the 6-digit level of the HS that could be exported to any of 
the eleven Arab League countries from 1998 to 2011. Our dataset is constructed by merging three 
data sources. First, we collect information on applied MFN tariffs, bilateral preferential tariffs, and 
import trade values from UNCTAD Trade Analysis and Information Systems (TRAINS) via the 
World Integrated Trade System (WITS) database. Second, information on import price index and 
quality-adjusted import price index was obtained from Feenstra & Romalis (2014) and is 
concorded from the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC Revision 2) product level 
code to 6-digit level code (HS). Finally, information on world export supply elasticity as faced by 
importers allows us to determine the effects of tariffs applied by countries with varying degrees of 
market power on international prices. This task is carried out by adding a measure of the inverse 
of export supply elasticity faced by importers, which were estimated by Nicita et al. (2018) to our 
dataset organized at the 6-digit level (HS).  
b. Descriptive Statistics: 




both Applied MFN tariffs and preferential tariffs. Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the 
main variables of interest. Our final sample contains 523,813, year, product, and importer 
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observations from 1998 to 2011. For our dependent variable, we use two different variables: (i) 
the import price index (IPI)73, calculated based on the price of the exporter at the origin excluding 
tariffs) and (ii) the quality-adjusted-import price index. The mean value for the import price index 
is 0.9713 (or 97.13) while the mean value for the quality-adjusted import price index is at 
approximately 0.8293 (or 82.93). 
Table 3-1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N mean sd max min 
Import price index 519303 0.9713 0.7843 71.7793 0.0037 
Import price index (ln) 519303 -0.1792 0.5227 4.2736 -5.5902 
Quality adj. import price index 519303 0.8293 0.2152 4.2009 0.1789 
Quality adj. import price index (ln) 519303 -0.2176 0.2454 1.4353 -1.7207 
Applied MFN 523813 1.1136 0.1421 3 1 
Applied MFN (ln) 523813 0.1009 0.1113 1.0986 0 
Avg. preferential tariff 521459 1.0749 0.1229 3 1 
Avg. preferential tariff (ln) 521459 0.0669 0.0997 1.0986 0 
 
Table 1 also shows that on average, applied MFN tariffs are approximately 11.36 percentage 
points while the average preferential tariff is approximately 7.49 percentage points, implying that 
the average preference margin is approximately 3.87 percentage points.  
Our initial analysis of the data suggests an inverse relationship between trade liberalization and 
international prices adjusted and not for quality; this, however, does not imply causality and our 
methodology next explores the causality issues.  
                                                 






. Then the GEKS import price index of country I relative to country k: 
 𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑔𝑡
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Figure 3-1. Relationship between Import Price Index, Quality-Adjusted Import Price Index and 
Tariffs 
Source: data taken from the UNCTAD-TRAINS and WTO 
 
III.  Empirical Analysis: 
In studying the effects of preferential trade agreements formed by Arab League countries for 
applied MFN tariffs, Silva & Benaddi (2018) find a building block effect, which implies that as 
these countries reduce preferential tariffs for their PTA members, they also reduce tariffs on non-
members. We also find that the building block effect is mitigated when the importing county 
exhibits high levels of market power. However, the effect on PTA members and non-members 
depends on how tariff changes affect the prices they face. However, because both tariffs fall, the 
effect on non-members is uncertain. Thus, our econometric model relies on two primary 
approaches where we use two different dependent variables: one based on the raw import price 
index and the other on the quality-adjusted import price index. Specifically, we estimate the 















1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
mean(mfn) mean(pref) mean(import price index) mean(qa_pri~p)
79 
 
𝐼𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝐹𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑣𝑔. 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡                                   (1) 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙. 𝑎𝑑𝑗. 𝐼𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝐹𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑣𝑔. 𝑝 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡                (2) 
Where the dependent variable 𝑰𝑷𝑰𝒊𝒋𝒕 represents raw imports price index based on the price of the 
exporter at the origin imposed on the importing country j in sector i at time t. 𝑸𝒖𝒂𝒍. 𝒂𝒅𝒋. 𝑰𝑷𝑰𝒊𝒋𝒕  
refers to the quality-adjusted import price index. The explanatory variable 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑴𝑭𝑵𝒊𝒋𝒕 is a 
tariff that country j imposes on imports on sector i at time t. 𝑨𝒗𝒈. 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒊𝒋𝒕 denotes the average 
preferential tariff applied by country j on imports from a preferential partner in sector i at time t. 
Additionally, a host of factors other than MFN and preferential tariffs may affect international 
prices for which information is not available across countries. Thus, we control for these additional 
factors, such as macroeconomic shocks, overall economic, historical, and political factors by 
introducing importer-year fixed effects denoted by 𝜶𝒊𝒕 and importer-industry fixed effects by 𝜸𝒊𝒋, 
where an industry is defined at the 2-digit HS level. The term 𝝐𝒊𝒋𝒕 represents the error term.  
The coefficients of interest in specifications (1) and (2) are 𝛽1 and 𝛽2. Negative and statistically 
significant 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 imply that reducing tariffs cause the importing country’s import price index 
(constructed before the tariffs) to increase. Earlier studies looked at how trade policies affect 
traditional measures of terms of trade, which can be misleading because unit values of 
internationally traded goods are heavily influenced by quality. However, we are better equipped 
to supply more accurate results on the effects of trade policies on terms of trade using quality-
adjusted import price index. 
IV.  Empirical Results 
In this paper, we will not provide a full analysis of the effects of tariff policy changes on a 
country’s terms of trade, which involves exports and imports; instead we focus on the import side, 
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which is an essential component to understanding how countries are affected through changes in 
prices they face. Table 2 reports the baseline results of estimating equations (1) and (2) using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) with and without fixed effects. Columns 1-4 show results of estimates 
using Equation (1) with and without the logarithmic transformation, while estimates in columns 
5-8 are obtained using Equation (2), also with and without the logarithmic transformation. The 
standard errors in all regressions are clustered at the product-year level. Consistent with theoretical 
predictions, the key coefficients in our regressions are negative and statistically significant. These 
findings imply that a multilateral tariff fall will promote demand for imported goods. A decrease 
in preferential tariffs, on the other hand, will increase demand for imported goods from PTA 
partners. The findings also suggest that trade liberalization, a result of gradual tariff reductions, 
induces less productive firms to enter export markets and thus charge higher prices, resulting in an 
overall increase in the import price index (Melitz, 2003).  
The coefficient on Applied MFN Tariff, as described in Column 1, suggests that a one 
percentage point decrease in applied MFN tariff leads to a 0.19 percentage point increase in 
international prices (as measured by import price index); this in turn implies that if domestic and 
foreign goods are perfectly substitutable, or homogeneous, then that reduces domestic prices by 
0.81 percentage points. When countries form PTAs, preferential partners can export at a 
preferential rate, thereby increasing the external price faced by the importing preferential member. 
The opposite may happen for exporters based outside a preferential agreement given the MFN 
tariff. Column 1 suggests that as Arab League countries reduce their preferential tariffs by one 
percentage point, international prices (the import price index) increase by 0.17 percentage points, 
and domestic prices of these imported goods then decrease by approximately 0.83 percentage 
points. These findings suggest that trade liberalization leads to lower consumer prices. Column 2 
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presents the results of estimating Equation (1) in a logarithmic form; the sign on both the 
coefficient of log Applied MFN and log Avg. Pref is negative, as we would expect, and remains 
statistically significant at the one percent level. 
Furthermore, we run the equivalents of columns 1 and 2 as shown in columns 3 and 4 to control 
for importer-year and importer-industry fixed effects for the reasons previously discussed. Our 
main specifications are those that control for the full set of fixed effects (importer-year and 
importer-industry). Estimates in Column 4, for example, imply that a one percent decrease in 
applied MFN tariffs results in a 0.16 percent increase in the import price index, while a decrease 
in preferential tariffs by one percent leads to a 0.08 percent increase in the import price index.  
Our results are consistent when running the equivalent of Equation (1) using the quality-
adjusted import price index as a dependent variable, as shown in Equation (2) when we control for 
fixed effects. The results in columns 5-8 show that the coefficients on Applied MFN and Avg. Pref 
are all in the same direction as those in columns 1-4. However, the coefficients are smaller. For 
example, the estimates in Column 8 reveal that a one percent decrease in applied MFN tariffs leads 
to a 0.07 percent increase in quality-adjusted import price index, which is much lower than the 
increase of 0.16 percent shown in Column 4. Similarly, a one percent decrease in preferential 
tariffs leads to a 0.04 percent increase in the quality-adjusted import price index compared to 0.08 
from Column 4. The overall quality of imported products can be higher or lower. If the existing 
most productive firms export more high-quality products due to lower tariffs, then the overall 
quality will be higher. However, if low production new exporters export more low-quality 
products, then the overall quality will be lower. Our findings, however, suggest that lower tariffs 
increase the quality-adjusted import price index by a smaller amount, which implies that the 
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international prices faced by the importing Arab League member rise with a decrease in tariffs but 
also suggest improved overall quality of imported goods. 
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             Table 3-2. The Impact of Trade Agreements on Import Prices and Quality-Adjusted Import Prices 
 
Imports Price Index (IPI)  Quality-Adjusted Imports Price Index (QAIPI) 
Dependent Variables IPI74 IPI(ln) IPI IPI(ln)  QAIPI75 QAIPI (ln) QAIPI QAIPI(ln) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Applied MFN -0.189***   -0.134***    0.003   -0.039***   
  (0.041)   (0.034)    (0.015)   (0.013)   
Avg. Pref -0.174***   -0.070*    -0.032   -0.028*   
  (0.057)   (0.041)    (0.022)   (0.015)   
                   
Applied MFN (ln)   -0.204***   -0.161***    -0.002   -0.074*** 
    (0.053)   (0.039)    (0.024)   (0.019) 
Avg. Pref (ln)   -0.219***   -0.084**    -0.047   -0.040* 
    (0.076)   (0.042)    (0.034)   (0.021) 
Constant 1.368*** -0.144***      0.859*** -0.214***     
  (0.043) (0.009)      (0.014) (0.004)     
Fixed Effects:                  
   Importer-Year No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
   Importer-Industry No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
                   
Observations 517,062 517,062 517,061 517,061  517,062 517,062 517,061 517,061 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the product-year level.  
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. 
                                                 
74 IPI: import price index. 
75 QAIPI: quality-adjusted import price index. 
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Preferential tariffs and applied MFN tariffs fall at different rates76 and in some cases may even 
go on opposite directions77. Findings from a study on Arab League countries, suggests that when 
members of this league form preferential trade agreements, it leads to a building block effect (Silva 
& Benaddi, 2018). That study reports that a one percentage point decrease in average preferential 
tariffs leads to 0.51 percentage points decrease in applied MFN tariffs. Our findings in this paper 
suggest that the fall in both applied MFN tariffs and preferential tariffs lead to a deterioration in 
the terms of trade of the importing country because imports have become more expensive after 
liberalizing trade. Column 3 suggests that a one standard deviation increase in applied MFN tariffs 
leads to a 0.01978 percentage point decrease in import price index while a one standard deviation 
increase in average preferential tariffs leads to a 0.00979 percentage point increase in the import 
price index. However, using a Wald test, we find that the effect of the two tariffs on import price 
index is not statistically different, implying that the two are equally important. 
 
                                                 
76 Estevaderodal et. al (2008), Pardo et. al. (2009), Ketterer et. al. (2014). 
77 Limao (2006) and Limao and Karakaovali (2008). 
78 The effect on import price index is measured by the product between the standard deviation of applied MFN tariff 
(see Table 1) and its coefficient (see Column 3 of Table 2):  0.1421*0.134=0.019.  
79 The effect on import price index is measured by the product between the standard deviation of average preferential 
tariffs (see Table 1) and its coefficient (see Column 3 of Table 2):  0.1229*0.0702=0.009. 
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Figure 3-2. The Evolution of Average MFN and Preferential Tariffs 
  Source: data taken from the UNCTAD-TRAINS and WTO 
Figure 1 clearly shows that average preferential tariffs fall by much more than applied MFN 
tariffs for the sample period. To confirm our findings on the effects of MFN tariffs and preferential 
tariffs, we test the difference between the effects of a change in average MFN tariffs over the 
sample period and that of preferential tariffs on import price index80 of the same period, and we 
find, once again, that the effect of the two trade policies are not statistically different, confirming 
that the two are equally important.  
Previous literature argues that the effects of PTAs depends on the type of agreement, whether 
CU or FTA. Because Arab League countries are involved in both types of agreement, we test 
whether preferential tariffs and MFN tariffs affect import price index under a CU differently than 
under an FTA. This objective is achieved by extending expressions (1) and (2) with two additional 
explanatory variables representing the interaction between variable 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑴𝑭𝑵 and 
𝑨𝒗𝒈. 𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒇 and a binary variable indicating whether importing country j is part of a CU (i.e., Gulf 
                                                 












Cooperation Council) at year t. If the coefficient of this variable is statistically significant, then we 
can conclude that import price index under an FTA is not affected by preferential tariffs and 
applied MFN tariffs in the same way as import price index under a CU. Table 3 shows the 
robustness of some of our results compared to the findings of Silva & Benaddi (2018) in that the 
CU formed by Arab League countries has a similar effect as an FTA.  
The first two columns in Table 3 show results of estimating specifications using equations (2) 
and (3) with the addition of the interaction between 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑴𝑭𝑵 and 𝑨𝒗𝒈. 𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒇 and the 𝑪𝑼 
dummy variable using OLS with and without fixed effects. The coefficients on the 𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒅 𝑴𝑭𝑵 
and 𝑨𝒗𝒈. 𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒇 in columns 1-4 are negative and statistically significant, which indicate that tariffs 
under FTAs lead to a deterioration of terms of trade for the importing country. These results are in 
line with Table 2. However, under a CU, the effect of the tariffs on import price index is 
ambiguous. For example, in Column 3, the effect of the CU, which is given by the summation of 
the coefficient of applied MFN and its interaction with a CU, leads deteriorating terms of trade. 
However, the preferential tariffs under a CU, given by the summation of the coefficient of average 
preferential tariffs and its interaction with a CU, leads improved terms of trade. More specifically, 
we find that a one percentage point increase in preferential tariffs leads to a 0.32581 percentage 
point increase in import price index, which does not agree with the FTA results. Our findings here 
suggest that applied MFN tariffs and preferential tariffs lead to deteriorating terms of trade, but 
under the CU, the results are either insignificant or slightly positive, unlike the results under FTA, 
depending on what specification is used.  
Furthermore, when we consider quality adjusted import price index as a dependent variable, 
                                                 
81 The effects of a CU is the summation of the coefficients of Avg. Pref and Avg. Pref*CU= -0.177+0.432=0.325 
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applied MFN tariffs follow previous patterns, negative and statistically significant, mainly when 
we use the full set of fixed effects. Results in Column 5 show that the CU does not affect the import 
price index. In Column 7, the effect of a CU as given by the summation of  the coefficient of 
applied MFN and its interaction with a CU is negative but not statistically significant and is in line 
with previous findings in columns 2, 4, 5, and 8. The effect of preferential tariffs under the CU is 
slightly positive and significant, suggesting that preferential access under a CU leads to improved 
terms of trade. Our findings on the CU lack statistical consistency. 
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Table 3-3. The Impact of Customs Union and Free Trade Areas on International Prices 
 
Dependent Variables 
 Imports Price Index (IPI)  Quality-Adjusted Imports Price Index (QAIPI) 
IPI IPI(ln) IPI IPI(ln)  QAIPI QAIPI (ln) QAIPI QAIPI (ln) 





































































































































Constant 1.263*** -0.151*** 
  





 (0.0131) (0.004) 
  
          
Test:   MFN + MFN*CU =0 [0.05]  [0.00]   [0.80]  [0.48]  
Test:   Avg. Pref + Avg. Pref*CU =0 [0.82]  [0.05]   [0.44]  [0.07]  
Test:   MFN (ln)+ MFN*CU (ln)=0  [0.73]  [0.11]   [0.07]  [0.98] 
Test:   Avg. Pref (ln)+Avg. Pref*CU (ln)=0  [0.79]  [0.54]   [0.83]  [0.44] 
Fixed Effects:          
   Importer-Year No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
   Importer-Product No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Observations 517,062 517,062 517,061 517,061  517,062 517,062 517,061 517,061 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the product-year level.  
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
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Next, we turn our attention to the role of market power of the importing country in explaining 
the results we have thus far. According to the theory of terms-of-trade countries tend to apply 
higher tariffs on products where they have greater market power in situations where international 
agreements do not constrain them.  As a result, products and industries in which country j has high 
import market power may be less likely to cut external tariffs and preferential tariffs. However, 
when countries adopt an FTA, some legitimate expectations under the GATT suggest country j 
will liberalize tariffs on “substantially all goods” with their PTA partners even where country j 
may have more import market power than their PTA partners82.  However, developing countries 
can implement FTAs and CUs under the GATT’s Enabling Clause, which does not have such a 
stringent requirement that internal tariffs must be liberalized on “substantially all goods.” If this is 
the case, then we may observe preferential tariff liberalization but not external liberalization in 
sectors in which country j has significant import market power. Silva and Benaddi (2018) find the 
building block effects of PTAs formed by Arab League countries mitigated for products and 
industries in which they have high market power. Specifically, they find that a one percentage 
point decrease in preferential tariffs leads to a 0.25 percentage point decrease in external tariffs in 
industries where the importing country exhibits high market power, while if the importing country 
shows low market power, we see a 0.65 percentage point decrease. What we do next is examine 
whether changes in country j’s tariffs affect import prices more or less in the presence of high or 
low market power. 
In Table 4, we test if market power affects how trade agreements change international prices. 
To achieve this objective, we estimate our main specifications using equations (1) and (2) using a 
                                                 
82And this is basic requirement of Article 24 of the GATT, which is an exception to the MFN principle that allows the 
formation of FTAs and CUs. 
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dummy variable (PWRMed) that indicates observations where the importer has high market 
power. More specifically, PWRMed is equal to one if the inverse of the export supply elasticity 
faced by the importer in a particular industry is higher than the median, 67th and 70th percentile of 
the distribution of the inverse elasticity (market power) by the importing country. In all columns, 
we estimate our model using OLS with and without fixed effects and with and without a 
logarithmic form.  
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Table 3-4. The Effects of Market Power Interacting with Trade Agreements on International Prices 
 Imports Price Index (IPI)  Quality-Adjusted Imports Price Index (QAIPI) 
Dependent Variables IPI IPI(ln) IPI IPI(ln)  QAIPI QAIPI(ln) QAIPI QAIPI(ln)  





































































































































Constant 1.198*** -0.161*** 
  





 (0.014) (0.004) 
  
          
Test:  MFN+ MFN_PWRMed=0 [0.00]  [0.00]   [0.05]  [0.00]  
Test:  Avg.Pref+ Avg.PrefPWRMed(ln)=0 [0.16]  [0.43]   [0.82]  [0.93]  
Test:  MFN (ln)+ MFN_PWRMed(ln)=0  [0.00]  [0.00]   [0.19]  [0.00] 
Test:  Avg.Pref(ln)+ Avg.Pref_PWRMed(ln)=0  [0.09]  [0.55]   [0.76]  [0.99] 
          
Fixed Effects: 
    
 
    
   Importer-Year No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
   Importer-Product No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes      
 
    
Observations 245,047 245,047 245,047 245,047  245,047 245,047 245,047 245,047 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the product-year level.  
 ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
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In all columns, with and without fixed effects, the coefficient on Applied MFN is negative and 
statistically significant in products for which the importing country has low market power. For 
example, Column 4 suggests that a one percent decrease in applied MFN tariffs leads to an increase 
in import price index of 0.29 percent. However, applied MFN tariffs in goods for which the 
importing country has market power above the median of the distribution the presence of market 
power mitigates the negative effect on importing countries as shown by the summation of the 
coefficient of applied MFN and its interaction with market power (MFN_PWRMed). Column 4 
suggests that when the importing country shows high market power, a one percent decrease in 
applied MFN tariffs leads to a 0.22 percent increase in the import price index. Thus, our estimates 
suggest that the negative effect is mitigated in products where importers have higher market power. 
One explanation for these findings about importers with high market power is that the impact of 
the MFN comes from both members and nonmembers of the PTAs. Thus, distinguishing who may 
be affected is difficult for members with lower preference margin or nonmembers because the 
MFN here is the average of both. 
Furthermore, Table 4 also shows the effect of preferential tariffs on import price index in the 
presence of market power. The results suggest that the effect of preferential tariffs on products for 
which the importing country has low market power, as indicated by the coefficient of Avg. Pref, 
are inconsistent and statistically insignificant. Column 4, for example, shows that a decrease in 
preferential tariffs leads to a worse import price index when the importing country has more market 
power, as shown by the summation of the coefficient of Avg. Pref and its interaction with market 
power (Avg. Pref_PWRMed). Similar findings are obtained when using the quality-adjusted import 
price index as a dependent variable. Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix C show results when the market 
power dummy variable is measured based on the 67th and 70th percentile of the distribution of 
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market power by the importing country. The results seem to be in line with those in Table 4.  The 
effect of applied MFN is consistent throughout when we control for fixed effects. A lower applied 
MFN tariff leads to higher import prices when the importing country shows low market power. 
However, this effect continues to be mitigated in the presence of high market power. The effect of 
preferential tariffs continues to be insignificant. Therefore, we find no evidence that market power 
affects this measure of terms of trade. Again, this could be because we do not distinguish between 
import prices from preferential partners and non-partners.  
To test if our results are consistent across Arab League Countries, we run our model using 
specifications in equations (1) and (2) using two subsamples based on geographical locations of 
the member countries, North Africa and the GCC countries, as well as their accession to the WTO, 
new versus old WTO members, because the trade policies of these countries vary based on their 
negotiations in the WTO. The econometric results in Table 5 differ from FTAs, confirming our 
findings in the benchmark results, which indicate that both applied MFN and preferential tariffs 
are not significant in determining the terms of trade in the GCC region. In addition, we test for the 
effect of market power in the GCC region and find that the market power of importing countries 
plays no role in their import prices as shown in Table 3 of the Appendix C. Again, this confirms 
our findings in Table 3, where the CU results differ from FTA results, which is in line with the 
findings of Silva & Benaddi (2018).  
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Table 3-5. Baseline Results using Gulf Cooperation Council Subsample 
 
 Dependent Variables 
 Imports Price Index (IPI)  Quality-Adjusted Imports Price Index (QAIPI) 
IPI IPI(ln) IPI IPI(ln)  QAIPI QAIPI(ln) QAIPI QAIPI (ln) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 



































































Constant 1.211*** -0.142*** 
  





 (0.051) (0.006) 
  
          
Fixed Effects: 
    
 
    
   Importer-Year No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
   Importer-Product No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Observations 255,576 255,576 255,575 255,575  255,576 255,576 255,575 255,575 
 Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the product-year level.  






We then estimate the same equations (1) and (2) for North African countries as shown in 
Table 6. The results from our entire sample seem to be driven mostly by those related to North 
African countries with and without fixed effects. Estimates in Column 2, for example, where 
we do not control for fixed effects suggest that a one percent decrease in applied MFN tariffs 
results in a 0.19 percent increase in the import price index, while a decrease in preferential 
tariffs by one percentage point leads to a 0.18 percentage point increase in the import price 
index. The results seem to hold even when we control for fixed effects. Results in Column 4 
of Table 6 are consistent with those in Column 4 of Table 2. Estimates in Column 4 suggest 
that a one percent decrease in applied MFN tariffs leads to a 0.16 percent increase in the import 
price index. A one percent decrease in preferential tariffs leads to a 0.09 percent increase in 
the import price index. The results when we consider North African countries seem consistent 
with those of the full sample.  
To compare the effect of applied MFN tariffs and preferential tariffs, we turn to Column 3 
of Table 6. Estimates in Column 3 suggest that a one standard deviation increase in applied 
MFN tariffs leads to a 0.02283 percentage point decrease in import price index while a one 
standard deviation increase in average preferential tariffs leads to a 0.01484 percentage point 
increase in import price index. However, using a Wald test, we find that the effect of the two 
tariffs on import price index does not differ statistically, implying that the two are equally 
important for this set of countries. 
                                                 
83 The effect on import price index is measured by the product between the standard deviation of applied MFN tariff 
(based on the subsample of North Africa) and its coefficient (see Column 3 of Table 6):  0.174*0.128=0.022.  
84 The effect on import price index is measured by the product between the standard deviation of Average preferential 
tariffs (based on the subsample of North Africa) and its coefficient (see Column 3 of Table 6):  0.15305*0.0919=0.014. 
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Furthermore, we test the robustness of our findings in relation to market power using the 
North African subsample. The effect of market power obtained using full sample seem to 
resonate better with the findings shown in Table 4 in the Appendix C. These findings suggest 
that market power matters for North African countries, particularly for the applied MFN but 
not as much for preferential tariffs. We also tried measuring the effect of market power using 
this subsample when the power dummy variable is equal to one if the inverse of the export 
supply elasticity face by the importer in a particular industry is higher than the median, 67th 
percentile of the distribution of the inverse elasticity (market power) by the importing country, 
but we did not observe any difference. 
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         Table 3-6. Baseline Results using North African Countries Subsample 
Dependent Variables  Imports Price Index (IPI)  Quality-Adjusted Imports Price Index(QAIPI) 
IPI IPI(ln) IPI IPI(ln)  QAIPI QAIPI(ln) QAIPI QAIPI(ln) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 



































































Constant 1.255*** -0.155*** 
  





 (0.014) (0.004) 
  
Fixed Effects: 
    
 
    
Importer-Year No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Importer-Product No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes      
 
    
Observations 261,486 261,486 261,486 261,486  261,486 261,486 261,486 261,486 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the product-year level.  






Our objective in this paper is to explore an essential component of the terms of trade, import 
price index, and quality-adjusted import price index. We have explained how using the quality-
adjusted import price index is a proper measure of terms of trade because unit values of 
internationally traded goods are heavily influenced by quality. In our analysis, we find that 
preferential trade agreements and trade liberalization tend to increase the price faced by importers 
but also promote quality thereby limiting the loss in the terms of trade at least from the importing 
side.  
Empirical results indicate that a one percentage point decrease in applied MFN tariffs leads to 
a reduction in international import prices of approximately 0.16 percentage points while domestic 
prices of imported goods, as well as those produced domestically if they are homogeneous, would 
fall by 0.84 percentage points. Moreover, we find that a one percentage point decrease in 
preferential tariffs leads to a 0.084 percentage point increase in international prices while domestic 
prices of imported goods decreased by 0.92 percentage points. We did not find perfect pass-thru 
of tariffs to consumers, but there are now studies that find that in the short run there is a complete 
pass-thru for U.S. tariffs to the U.S. consumer prices implying that they do not affect international 
prices. In addition, we find no significant effects of MFN tariffs and preferential tariffs on the 
terms of trade under a CU. Furthermore, our results provide no evidence that market power affects 
this measure of terms of trade under a CU. 
In this paper, we do not provide a full analysis of the terms of trade, focusing instead only on 
the import side. If import prices rise for the importer that means their terms of trade would 
deteriorate relative to the exporting country. A future extension could include the export side to 
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Appendix A - Chapter 1  
Table A 1. Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
 
𝒂. 𝑺𝒂𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒊𝒏 ≥ 𝟐. 𝟓 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
MFN 9419 12.80 15.70 2.50 5.00 5.00 15.85 200.00 
minpref 9415 3.27 8.23 0.00 0.00 0.33 2.27 160.83 
L_minpref 9419 4.91 10.54 0.00 0.00 0.83 4.65 180.00 
bound 8774 38.24 41.82 5.00 15.00 28.75 40.00 2145.71 
BIND 9419 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
L_BIND 9419 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
optimal 7950 0.14 0.49 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.11 10.05 
 
b. 𝑪𝑼 𝑺𝒂𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒊𝒏 ≥ 𝟐. 𝟓 avg 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
MFN 4993 7.04 12.83 2.50 4.85 5.00 5.00 125.00 
avgprefCUdum 4991 0.75 4.26 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.45 87.50 
L_avgprefCUdum 4993 1.54 5.34 0.00 0.00 0.17 1.30 100.00 
bound 4881 36.26 37.89 5.00 13.91 15.00 35.00 200.00 
BIND 4993 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
L_BIND 4993 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
optimal 3751 0.16 0.39 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.14 5.85 
 
c. 𝑪𝑼 𝑺𝒂𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒊𝒏 ≥ 𝟐. 𝟓 𝒎𝒊𝒏 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
MFN 5188 7.00 12.61 2.50 4.86 5.00 5.00 125.00 
minprefCUdum 5186 0.56 3.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 76.13 
L_minprefCUdum 5188 1.25 4.60 0.00 0.00 0.09 1.00 100.00 
bound 5075 36.35 37.84 5.00 14.00 15.00 35.00 200.00 
BIND 5188 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
L_BIND 5188 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
optimal 3882 0.16 0.41 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.14 5.85 
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             Table A 2. First Stage Regressions for Table 3  
 





































      
prefp2min  0.352*** 
(0.092) 
      






















































Shea Partial R2 0.12 0.04 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.16 0.11 0.14 
Notes: Country-industry and country-year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesesand  adjusted for clustering  
at the country-industry level. P-values are reported in brackets.  
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
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             Table A 3. First Stage Regressions for Table 4 
 
Dependent Variables  
  
L_avgpref L_avgprefCUdum L_minpref L_minprefCUdum L_avgpref L_avgprefCUdum 




































































       












Shea Partial R2 0.14 0.31 0.18 0.29 0.09 0.17 
Notes: Country-industry and country-year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and adjusted for clustering  
at the country-industry level. P-values are reported in brackets.  
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
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           Table A 4. First Stage Regressions for Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Dependent Variables  
  
L_minpref L_minprefCUdum L_avgpref L_avgprefCUdum L_minpref L_minprefCUdum 
  (6) (7) (8) 




    




    




    





































       












Shea Partial R2 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.06 
Notes: Country-industry and country-year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and adjusted for clustering  
at the country-industry level. P-values are reported in brackets.  








Appendix B - Chapter 2 
Table B 1: Probability a Product is Traded – Sample of Countries in North Africa and the Middle East 
Product Traded   Tunisia                                 Jordan                                    Oman                
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
Water (ln) -0.142*** -0.140*** -0.848***   -0.209*** -0.237*** -0.320***   -0.208*** -0.210*** -0.131** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.075)   (0.009) (0.009) (0.022)   (0.008) (0.008) (0.057) 
Applied MFN (ln) -0.079*** -0.064*** -0.816***   0.031*** 0.058*** -0.221***   0.046*** 0.068*** -0.066 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.073)   (0.005) (0.005) (0.016)   (0.012) (0.011) (0.048) 
Constant 0.148*** 0.145*** 0.423***   0.101*** 0.100*** 0.131***   0.115*** 0.114*** 0.115*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.028)   (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)   (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) 
                        
F-test  1558.56 1532.35 70.26   564.78 808.84 108.81   337.75 362.56 9.12 
  [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]   [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00]    [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Fixed Effects:                       
 Exporter-Year NO YES YES   NO YES YES   NO YES YES 
 Exporter-Product NO NO YES   NO NO YES   NO NO YES 
Observations 2,701,617 2,701,617 2,701,617   3,434,597 3,434,597 3,434,597   2,947,366 2,947,366 2,947,366 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the product-year level. P-values are reported in brackets.  










     Table B 2: Probability a Product is Traded – Sample of Countries in North Africa and the Middle East 
Product Traded Bahrain                                United Arab Emirates                                  Saudi Arabia            
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
Water (ln) -0.169*** -0.197*** -0.287***   0.009 0.011 0.298**   -0.320*** -0.341*** -0.147*** 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.110)   (0.008) (0.008) (0.136)   (0.012) (0.013) (0.026) 
Applied MFN (ln) 0.008 0.036** -0.143   0.099*** 0.092*** 0.538***   0.149*** 0.209*** -0.015 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.096)   (0.022) (0.022) (0.137)   (0.012) (0.017) (0.019) 
Constant 0.183*** 0.188*** 0.219***   0.133*** 0.133*** 0.0897***   0.126*** 0.124*** 0.129*** 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.031)   (0.001) (0.001) (0.017)   (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
                        
F-test  51.66 77.37 14.14   11.61 11.16 38.02   554.02 442.01 38.85 
  [0.00 [0.00] [0.00]   [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]   [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Fixed Effects:                       
 Exporter-Year NO YES YES   NO YES YES   NO YES YES 
 Exporter-Product NO NO YES   NO NO YES   NO NO YES 
Observations 1,466,770 1,466,770 1,466,770   5,334,579 5,334,579 5,334,579   6,345,613 6,345,613 6,345,613 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the product-year level. P-values are reported in brackets.  





1. Summary Statistics: Morocco 
Variable N mean sd 
Product Traded 4544785 0.096 0.295 
Product Traded_10 4544785 0.085 0.279 
Water (ln) 4544785 0.185 0.131 
Bound Tariffs (ln) 4544785 0.338 0.087 
Applied MFN (ln) 4544785 0.163 0.150 
 
2. Summary Statistics: Egypt 
Variable N mean sd 
Product Traded 7262845 0.100 0.300 
Product Traded_10 7262845 0.092 0.289 
Water (ln) 7262845 0.121 0.106 
Bound Tariffs (ln) 7262845 0.224 0.181 
Applied MFN (ln) 7262845 0.109 0.156 
 
3. Summary Statistics: Tunisia 
Variable N mean sd 
Product Traded 2701617 0.105 0.307 
Product Traded_10 2701617 0.094 0.291 
Water (ln) 2701617 0.201 0.165 
Bound Tariffs (ln) 2701617 0.380 0.200 
Applied MFN (ln) 2701617 0.181 0.154 
 
4. Summary Statistics: Emirates 
Variable N mean sd 
Product Traded 5334579 0.138 0.345 
Product Traded_10 5334579 0.124 0.330 
Water (ln) 5334579 0.082 0.067 
Bound Tariffs (ln) 5334579 0.127 0.076 





5. Summary Statistics: Saudi 
Variable N mean sd 
Product Traded 6345613 0.122 0.327 
Product Traded_10 6345613 0.112 0.315 
Water (ln) 6345613 0.043 0.042 
Bound Tariffs (ln) 6345613 0.096 0.052 
Applied MFN (ln) 6345613 0.061 0.039 
 
6. Summary Statistics: Qatar 
Variable N mean sd 
Product Traded 2548880 0.165 0.371 
Product Traded_10 2548880 0.146 0.353 
Water (ln) 2548880 0.094 0.069 
Bound Tariffs (ln) 2548880 0.139 0.085 
Applied MFN (ln) 2548880 0.046 0.042 
 
7. Summary Statistics: Bahrain 
Variable N mean sd 
Product Traded 1466770 0.143 0.351 
Product Traded_10 1466770 0.127 0.332 
Water (ln) 1466770 0.237 0.066 
Bound Tariffs (ln) 1466770 0.289 0.089 
Applied MFN (ln) 1466770 0.054 0.068 
 
8. Summary Statistics: Oman 
Variable N mean sd 
Product Traded 2947366 0.103 0.304 
Product Traded_10 2947366 0.094 0.291 
Water (ln) 2947366 0.069 0.071 
Bound Tariffs (ln) 2947366 0.116 0.088 





9. Summary Statistics: Kuwait 
Variable N mean sd 
Product Traded 2292388 0.169 0.375 
Product Traded_10 2292388 0.147 0.354 
Water (ln) 2292388 0.627 0.105 
Bound Tariffs (ln) 2292388 0.670 0.108 
Applied MFN (ln) 2292388 0.043 0.027 
 
10.  Summary Statistics: Jordan 
Variable N mean sd 
Product Traded 3434597 0.093 0.291 
Product Traded_10 3434597 0.086 0.279 
Water (ln) 3434597 0.053 0.062 
Bound Tariffs (ln) 3434597 0.133 0.092 












Appendix C - Chapter 3 
              Table C 1. The Effects of Market Power Interacting with Trade Agreements on International Prices Full Sample 
 
Dependent Variables 
Imports Price Index (IPI)  Quality Adjusted Imports Price Index (QAIPI) 
IPI IPI(ln) IPI IPI(ln)  QAIPI QAIPI(ln) QAIPI QAIPI(ln) 











































































































   




   
(0.014) 





   




   
(0.017) 
Constant 1.198*** -0.161*** 
  





 (0.014) (0.003) 
  
Fixed Effects: 
    
 
    
   Importer-Year No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
   Importer-Product No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Observations 245,047 245,047 245,047 245,047  245,047 245,047 245,047 245,047 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the product-year level.  





            Table C 2. The Effects of Market Power Interacting with Trade Agreements on International Prices using a Full sample 
 
Dependent Variables 
Imports Price Index (IPI)  Quality Adjusted Imports Price Index (QAIPI) 
IPI IPI (ln) IPI IPI (ln)  QAIPI QAIPI (ln) QAIPI QAIPI (ln) 





































































































































Constant 1.198*** -0.161*** 
  





 (0.013) (0.004) 
  
Fixed Effects: 
    
 
    
   Importer-Year No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
   Importer-Product No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Observations 245,047 245,047 245,047 245,047  245,047 245,047 245,047 245,047 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the product-year level.  





      Table C 3. The Effects of Market Power Interacting with Trade Agreements on International Prices in GCC Countries  
 
Dependent Variables 
Imports Price Index (IPI)  Quality Adjusted Imports Price Index (QAIPI) 
IPI IPI(ln) IPI IPI(ln)  QAIPI QAIPI(ln) QAIPI QAIPI(ln) 





































































































































Constant 1.013*** -0.176*** 
  





 (0.047) (0.005) 
  
          
Fixed Effects:          
   Importer-Year No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
   Importer-Product No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Observations 89,651 89,651 89,651 89,651  89,651 89,651 89,651 89,651 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the product-year level.  





            Table C 4. The Effects of Market Power Interacting with Trade Agreements on International Prices North Africa Countries 
 
Dependent Variables 
Imports Price Index (IPI)  Quality Adjusted Imports Price Index (QAIPI) 
IPI IPI(ln) IPI IPI(ln)  QAIPI QAIPI(ln) QAIPI QAIPI(ln) 





































































































































Constant 1.186*** -0.152*** 
  





 (0.014) (0.004) 
  
          
Fixed Effects: 
    
 
    
   Importer-Year No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
   Importer-Product No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Observations 155,396 155,396 155,396 155,396  155,396 155,396 155,396 155,396 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the product-year level.  
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. 
 
  
